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Abstract
Judicial opinions typically rely on “facts” about a social group to justify or reject
limitations on group members’ rights, especially when traditional views about
the status or capacity of group members are in contest. Yet the fact-based ap-
proach to decision-making obscures the normative judgments that actually deter-
mine whether restrictions on individual rights are reasonable. This article offers
an account of how and why courts intervene in social conflicts by focusing on
facts rather than declaring norms. In part, it argues that this approach preserves
judicial power to retain traditional justifications for restricting group members’
rights in some settings but not others without having to explain the inconsistent
treatment of group-related norms. The consequences of the fact-based decision-
making fiction appear strikingly in many contemporary same-sex marriage cases,
where courts treat procreative facts as decisive and avoid reconciling gay couples’
exclusion from marriage with other decisions that treat sexual orientation-based
differences as legally insignificant. In that light, the article tests the costs and ben-
efits of greater candor regarding the normative underpinnings of decisions.
The article also challenges the claim that courts can and should remain neu-
tral in public debates by sustaining traditional norms when views about social
groups are in contest. It argues that this position, like the judicial embrace of
fact-based decision-making, rests on the same flawed premise that restrictions on
social groups can be evaluated based on facts alone. Our theories of judicial re-
view will be better off, both with respect to descriptive accuracy and normative
bite, to the extent they recognize the inevitable involvement of courts in making
normative judgments about social groups.
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By Suzanne B. Goldberg1
Judicial opinions typically rely on “facts” about a social group to justify or reject 
limitations on group members’ rights, especially when traditional views about the status or 
capacity of group members are in contest.  Yet the fact-based approach to decision-making 
obscures the normative judgments that actually determine whether restrictions on individual rights 
are reasonable.  This article offers an account of how and why courts intervene in social conflicts 
by focusing on facts rather than declaring norms.  In part, it argues that this approach preserves 
judicial power to retain traditional justifications for restricting group members’ rights in some 
settings but not others without having to explain the inconsistent treatment of group-related norms.  
The consequences of the fact-based decision-making fiction appear strikingly in many 
contemporary same-sex marriage cases, where courts treat procreative facts as decisive and avoid 
reconciling gay couples’ exclusion from marriage with other decisions that treat sexual 
orientation-based differences as legally insignificant.  In that light, the article tests the costs and 
benefits of greater candor regarding the normative underpinnings of decisions.   
 
The article also challenges the claim that courts can and should remain neutral in public 
debates by sustaining traditional norms when views about social groups are in contest.  It argues 
that this position, like the judicial embrace of fact-based decision-making, rests on the same 
flawed premise that restrictions on social groups can be evaluated based on facts alone.   Our 
theories of judicial review will be better off, both with respect to descriptive accuracy and 
normative bite, to the extent they recognize the inevitable involvement of courts in making 
normative judgments about social groups.  
 
Table of Contents 
 
I. The Pervasive Practice of Fact-Based Decision-Making………………. 17 
A. “Thin” Facts and Unstated Norms…………………………………..17 
B. “Thick” Facts and The Merger of Norm Into Fact…………………..22 
II. Fact-Based Interventions in Contested Normative Terrain……………...28 
A. Interventions Via “New” Facts………………………………………28 
B. Fact-Based Decisions as the Groundwork for Norm Declarations…..32 
C. The Non-Neutrality of Fact-Based Decision-Making………………..37 
III. The Role of Social Science and Social Movements in a Jurisprudence of 
 Fact-Based Decision-Making…………………………………………….43 
IV. Theorizing Judicial Norm Avoidance……………………………………48 
V. The Legitimacy of Fact-Based Adjudication:  Would Candor Be Better..60 
VI. Conclusion……………………………………………………………….72 
 
1 Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Newark.  This Article was written while I was a 
Visiting Professor at Columbia Law School; I thank both Columbia and Rutgers for their financial support 
for this project.  Many thanks for their insights to Michelle Adams, Mary Anne Case, Ariela Dubler, Bill 
Eskridge, Gary Francione, Richard Goldberg, Philip Hamburger, Edward Hartnett, Nan Hunter, John 
Leubsdorf, Jim Liebman, Tamara Lothian, Gillian Metzger, Jim Pope, Richard Primus, Catherine Sharkey, 
Peter Strauss, Susan Sturm, Jeremy Waldron, Mark Weiner, the participants in the Columbia Law School 
Faculty Workshop and the LGBT Law Faculty Workshop of Greater New York, and especially Henry 
Monaghan.  I am grateful to Todd Anten for outstanding research assistance. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
2Courts . . . do not sit or act in a social vacuum. . . . . [W]hat once was a “natural” and 
“self-evident” ordering later comes to be seen as an artificial and invidious constraint on 
human potential and freedom.2
Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between 
male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too much of our 
history there was the same inertia in distinguishing between black and white.3
Introduction 
 
How do we measure tipping points in constitutional litigation?  More specifically, 
how do courts decide whether traditionally accepted views of social groups have 
transformed, as a result of societal change, into impermissible justifications for restricting 
group members’ rights?4 In addressing these questions, this article has two aims:  The 
first is to advance our understanding of how courts intervene in conflicts regarding 
popular views of social groups.  The second is to challenge the widely held view that 
 
2 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
3 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
4 By social groups, I simply mean clusters of individuals that are treated by the surrounding community as 
comprising an independently identifiable group based on a shared characteristic or practice.  The 
“particular social group” category in asylum law, which is one of five grounds on which individuals who 
have a well-founded fear of persecution can seek asylum, helps illuminate the social group concept as I use 
it here.  See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985) (describing particular social group 
membership as defined by a shared characteristic “that the members of the group either cannot change, or 
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences”), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).   
While the definition of social group might be construed more broadly to encompass groups linked 
by occupation (e.g., lawyers, opticians, pushcart vendors) or other interests as much as groups linked by 
traits that are arguably more deeply rooted, my focus here is on groups that are conventionally viewed as 
making civil rights-based claims and as having the sort of connection identified in Matter of Acosta. These 
groups include people of color, women, people with mental retardation, and lesbians and gay men, among 
others.  Cf. Robert Cover, Origin of Judicial Activism, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1299 (1982) (describing a 
common conceptualization of minorities as groups “deemed to have a common element of dominating 
significance, observable in social structure and social process as they affect politics”).  Still, the positive 
and normative accounts set out below likely also would have relevance to adjudication of constitutional 
claims brought by groups affiliated by “some common impulse or interest.”  See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 
801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (characterizing a particular social group as “a collection of people 
closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common impulse or interest”). 
 For discussion of the relationship of social groups to social movements, see Tomiko Brown-
Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law:  The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 
1488-1527 (2005).  For social science perspectives on the concept of social group, see, e.g., STEREOTYPES 
AS EXPLANATIONS: THE FORMATION OF MEANINGFUL BELIEFS ABOUT SOCIAL GROUPS (Craig McGarty et 
al. eds., 2002). 
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3courts ought to minimize the invasiveness of judicial intervention by sustaining the status 
quo when views about social groups are in contest.   
 The current wave of litigation by gay and lesbian couples seeking to marry 
prompts the inquiry here, as these cases saliently illustrate the tensions associated with 
adjudicating challenges to longstanding norms regarding social groups.  At this moment, 
judges around the United States are deciding whether the rationales traditionally accepted 
to justify gay couples’ exclusion from marriage should now be understood, in light of 
changing social views, to reflect impermissible hostility rather than legitimate 
government interests.  Some have found it “eminently rational for the Legislature to 
postpone making fundamental changes to [marriage] until such time as there is 
unanimous scientific evidence, or popular consensus, or both, that such changes can 
safely be made.”5 Others, by contrast, have concluded that excluding gay couples from 
marriage “cannot plausibly further” a state’s aim of “ensuring the optimal setting for 
child rearing” in light of changing demographics and laws recognizing that “people in 
same-sex couples may be ‘excellent’ parents.”6
The inquiry here also is prompted by a similar pattern in federal civil rights 
litigation where claims are made that once-acceptable views regarding sex, race, and 
other characteristics have become destabilized as a consequence of societal change.  In 
 
5 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1003 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting).  See also 
Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 266-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
6 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962-63 (majority opinion).  See also Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 2005).  One other court, the Vermont Supreme Court, sought to temper its rejection 
of the traditional exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage by authorizing the legislature to remedy the 
state constitutional violation.  See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).  The Legislature ultimately 
adopted a civil union statute that provided parity of rights and benefits within Vermont for gay and non-gay 
couples.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2000).  For a defense of this type of balancing approach, see 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance:  Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of 
Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021 (2004). 
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4these cases, parallel questions arise regarding whether the traditional justifications remain 
legitimate bases for different treatment.   
 Yet even if we assume that courts stay roughly within the parameters of 
acceptable change set by the broader society,7 we are left to wonder how courts 
assimilate changing views about social groups and simultaneously avoid being perceived 
as unduly usurping the legislature’s prerogative to reflect the people’s will.8 While this 
 
7 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2606 
(“[J]udicial decisions rest within a range of acceptability to a majority of the people,”); Robert C. Post, The 
Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword:  Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law,
117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture.”).  See 
also Steven  G. Calabresi, Thayer’s Clear Mistake, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 272 (1993) (“Mr. Dooley’s 
dictum about the Supreme Court’s tendency to follow the election returns seems no less apt today than 
when it was first printed almost a century ago.”).  Although the received wisdom may be acknowledged 
broadly, the question whether the dialectic relationship between courts and society is desirable remains 
contentious, especially in originalist quarters.  See generally SCOTT D. BERGER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1999) (describing Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence as aiming to 
discern and apply the framers’ original principles). 
8 One could argue that the operative category here is better characterized not as social groups but as issues 
or conduct.  After all, the perceived link among group members may be common conduct or shared 
sensibilities or capacities that differentiate group members from others.  Further, normative judgments 
about group members tend to inform normative judgments about members’ conduct and capacity and vice 
versa.  Thus, the distinction between popular views about a group and views about issues or conduct related 
to that group is often fuzzy, at best.  The dominant tradition of regulating conduct as a means of regulating 
group members exacerbates this lack of clarity.  Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) 
(recognizing that Texas’s regulation of “homosexual conduct” impacted the rights of lesbians and gay 
men).  Indeed, a significant line of equal protection jurisprudence is occupied with the question whether 
regulation that is arguably conduct-based actually reflects impermissible sentiment regarding a social 
group.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).  Because group members bear the brunt of regulation—whether the 
regulation explicitly targets conduct or a trait, I find the social group category most useful for getting at the 
process by which courts absorb social change as it concerns subpopulations and the issues affiliated with 
them.  Admittedly, the fit is not perfect.  I flag below places where the risk of slippage is greatest and 
where a focus on issues rather than groups might be the better analytic lens.  
 More broadly, the focus here on change involving social groups and related issues is but one 
dimension of a larger conversation about the relationship between courts and societal change.  The 
common law, for example, has long embodied the expectation that courts will take account of change in 
developing legal principles.  See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933) (“[T]he common law is 
not immutable but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions.”); see also GUIDO 
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 3-4 (1982) (describing common law courts as the 
“principal instruments” for “balanc[ing] the need for continuity and change”).  Likewise, strong arguments 
have been advanced that courts should take societal change into account in statutory interpretation.  See, 
e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).  The claims here likely have 
some application to adjudication in non-constitutional settings as well as to constitutional adjudication 
involving changes to attitudes, practices, and technology that are not related directly to social groups.  I 
leave the development of these arguments to another day.  
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5concern is a perennial one for courts, the relative finality of constitutional adjudication 
heightens it in ways that statutory interpretation and common law adjudication do not.9
The existing scholarship on judicial review goes a step further than the received 
wisdom regarding the close relationship between judicial analysis and prevailing social 
views by not only recognizing the tension embedded in the judicial role in these kinds of 
cases but also advancing normative arguments for its mitigation.  Popular 
constitutionalists, who reject judicial supremacy over constitutional interpretation, 
contend that courts lack both the accountability and competence to constitutionalize 
determinations about contested social issues such as the exclusion of gay couples from 
marriage.10 Others argue that, rather than categorical judicial restraint, the common law 
approach of “rational traditionalism,” can and should guide judicial review.11 This 
approach, as articulated by David Strauss, would require courts to “think twice about . . . 
judgments of right and wrong when they are inconsistent with what has gone before” and 
move incrementally, in most instances, rather than breaking sharply with longstanding 
 
9 See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 8, at 4 (“The incremental nature of common law adjudication means 
that no single judge could ultimately change the law, and a series of judges could only do so over time and 
in response to changed events or to changed attitudes in the people.”); Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the 
Dawn of a New Century:  Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
16 (1995) (“There is of course a ‘critical difference’ between when courts make constitutional law and 
when they make common law.  Outside the area of constitutional adjudication, state court decisions ‘are 
subject to overrule or alteration by ordinary statute.  The court is standing in for the legislature, and if it has 
done so in a way the legislature does not approve, it can soon be corrected.’  But when a case is decided on 
constitutional grounds, the court solidifies the law in ways that may not be as susceptible to subsequent 
modification either by courts or by legislatures.”) (footnotes and citations omitted).    
10 See generally LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); 
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Adrian Vermeule, Judicial Review and Institutional 
Choice, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1557 (2002). 
11 See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 
(1996). 
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6traditions.12 Robert Post has offered still another approach, invoking Louis Brandeis to 
suggest the centrality of “practical tact and judgment” to preserve legal authority.13 
Even these arguments, however, offer only general observations about and 
recommendations for judicial decision-making when the surrounding societal terrain is in 
contest.  By unearthing and critiquing the structural features of adjudication where views 
regarding social groups are, or have been, in flux, this article aims to provide a more 
rigorous, specific account of the process by which courts “tip” from one understanding of 
a social group and its constitutional claims to another.   
The starting point for the claims made here is that courts14 are very much engaged 
in absorbing, evaluating, and responding to changes in popular views of social groups.15 
A search for overt declarations of new constitutional norms regarding group members 
will not expose this engagement, however, as these occur relatively infrequently and, 
typically, after change already has been absorbed in other ways.  The better place to look 
for the judicial response to social change when norms about a group are in flux is in cases 
resting on “facts” about social groups.  In these cases, courts characterize their analyses 
of restrictions on group members as though they involve neutral assessments of facts 
about individuals’ status and capacity rather than normative judgments about how those 
facts relate to the restrictions imposed.16 Only after an initial foray (or series of forays) 
 
12 Id. at 896-97.  Strauss adds that rejection of tradition is justified when, “on reflection, we are sufficiently 
confident that we are right, and . . . the stakes are high enough.”  Id. at 897. 
13 Post, supra note 7, at 109. 
14 Although the discussion below focuses heavily on U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, much of the 
analysis and some of the discussion apply to state courts and lower federal courts as well. 
15 This analysis rests on the belief that constitutional adjudication involves a “gradual process of judicial 
inclusion and exclusion.”  Davidson v. Louisiana, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).  The decisions below 
demonstrate this evolutionary theory’s descriptive validity and set the foundation for my scrutiny of how 
social groups fit within the evolutionary process.  A normative defense of constitution adjudication as an 
evolving process rather than as fixed and determined exclusively by text and/or history is beyond the scope 
here.   
16 As will be explained shortly, the distinction between fact and norm is drawn here for heuristic purposes 
rather than to suggest a fundamental difference between the two. 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art29
7through fact-based cases has been made do courts acknowledge the normative 
underpinnings of the earlier decisions.  
Numerous cases illustrate the pervasiveness of this fact-based approach to 
adjudication.  Consider, for example, the Court’s determination that “modern knowledge” 
of race discrimination’s harmful effects required invalidation of school desegregation in 
Brown v. Board of Education.17 Although Brown is widely treated as having established 
the normative impermissibility of racial segregation, the Court’s opinion did not actually 
discuss, much less condemn, societal norms regarding the inferiority of African 
Americans that had previously justified that race-based distinction.  The Court’s recent 
decision in Grutter v. Bollinger18 also highlights the judicial inclination toward fact-based 
analysis when social norms are in contest.19 There, the decisional linchpin, at least 
overtly, related not to the normative value of affirmative action as a remedy for past 
discrimination but instead to the factual benefits of diversity, which the Court found 
sufficient to justify the University of Michigan Law School’s consideration of race in 
admissions.20 Judicial approaches to sex equality in the early 1970s likewise were 
framed in terms of “new” or changed facts requiring a break with the past normative view 
that women were less capable in the public sphere than men.  Yet even as facts were 
proffered as decisive—e.g., women have as much experience administering estates as 
men, so sex-based distinctions in estate administration cannot stand21—the decisions 
unquestionably forged new normative ground.  Romer v. Evans, which invalidated a 
 
17 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).  See infra text accompanying notes 90-95. 
18 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
19 Affirmative action arguably is better characterized as implicating popular views of an issue rather than a 
social group.  See supra note 7.  But see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Affirmative Action and Colorblindness From 
the Original Position, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2009 (2004) (discussing ways in which views of race shape views 
of affirmative action). 
20 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-33.  See infra text accompanying notes 102-106. 
21 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); see also infra text accompanying notes 107-110. 
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8Colorado amendment barring antidiscrimination protections for gay people, also was cast 
as a fact-driven decision.22 The Court refused to address the “moral disapproval of 
homosexuality” norm advanced by the dissent, and instead pinned its holding on the lack 
of factual connection between Colorado’s ban and the government’s alleged interests in 
protecting associational freedom and scarce governmental resources.23 
While this fact-based decision-making strategy has many appeals, which will be 
developed below, its theoretical foundations are shaky, at best.  After all, facts alone do 
not supply the judgment necessary to decide whether a law related to a social group is 
reasonable.  As David Hume famously put the point, an “ought” cannot be derived from 
an “is.”24 The fact that women tend to have primary childcare responsibilities, for 
example, does not determine whether a law that treats women differently from men 
responds reasonably to that fact or effectuates illegitimate, negative views about women’s 
capacity.  Instead, courts must make normative judgments about the relevance of 
(purported) factual differences between men and women in order to evaluate laws 
restricting women’s rights.  The same is true for evaluations of restrictions on other social 
groups.  That courts focus on facts and leave normative judgments unmentioned obscures 
but does not eliminate their influence on both analysis and outcomes.25 
The pervasiveness of this fact-based adjudication strategy, with its fictional 
premise and its related obfuscation of decisive norms, prompts several questions about 
the ways in which courts react to constitutional claims by social groups.  What, exactly, is 
 
22 517 U.S. 620, 632-36 (1996).   
23 Id.  See infra text accompanying notes 111-114. 
24 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (Book III, Part I, Section I) (L.A. Selby-Bigge & 
P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford 2d ed. 1978) (1739). 
25 This form of reasoning from fact directly to judgment, without analysis of the norms at issue, allows for 
incompletely theorized decisions as well as the operation of inchoate, unconscious, or ill-formulated norms, 
as will be discussed infra. For extended discussion of undertheorized decisions, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword:  Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).    
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art29
9the relationship between facts and norms in constitutional adjudication?  Why does a 
fact-based approach to adjudication dominate where norms about social groups are in 
contest?  What can we learn from it about the factors that influence judicial responses to 
constitutional adjudication regarding social group members?  What does this approach 
suggest for advocates and courts enmeshed in social change litigation?  And, finally, 
what would be the benefits, and costs, of displacing fact-based adjudication with a 
commitment to judicial candor regarding the norms underlying decisions?   
The remainder of this article will explore these questions in the context of 
constitutional adjudication where popular views about the status and capacity of social 
group members are contested.  Before sketching the article’s claims regarding each of 
these questions, a preliminary caveat is in order.  While separating facts from norms is 
useful heuristically for purposes of identifying a significant judicial decision-making 
dynamic,26 the distinction should not be overstated.  Facts, as well as norms, are 
inevitably theory soaked and socially constructed.27 Like the difference between law and 
fact, the distinction between norms and facts “does not imply the existence of static, polar 
opposites.  Rather, [norms and facts] have a nodal quality; they are points of rest and 
relative stability on a continuum of experience.”28 Yet while the two are inevitably 
interrelated, courts invest a great deal of significance in the perceived boundary between 
them.  Through interrogating the judicial reification of this boundary, we can begin to 
 
26 Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233 (1985) (“In our legal 
system, the categories [of law and fact] have functioned as crucially important constructs that permit us to 
understand, organize, and regulate certain forms of social experience.”).  Jurgen Habermas has explored a 
different dimension of the relationship between fact and norm at length as it relates to the status and 
legitimacy of law.  See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACT AND NORM: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
27 See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law:  The Disaggregation of Sex 
From Gender, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (1995) (making this point with respect to the treatment of sex as fact 
and gender as norm); Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionist 
Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629, 650-53 (2002) (discussing the occasional recognition by courts of 
the socially constructed nature of facts).    
28 Monaghan, supra note 26, at 233. 
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10
demystify and critique the process by which courts absorb change in the surrounding 
society.   
In Part I, I lay the groundwork for this analysis by exploring the fact-based 
approach to adjudication of constitutional claims by social group members.  In addition to 
establishing its existence and pervasiveness as a general matter, I identify two different 
configurations of the fact/norm relationship that will be critical to later discussion of the 
pressure points on courts to absorb social change.  These clusters can be defined by their 
reliance on either “thick” or “thin” facts.  
 “Thick” facts (or normative facts, as I sometimes call them here) are loaded 
evaluative facts.  They contain both description (group X has a particular characteristic) 
and evaluation (the characteristic limits the status or capacity of group X).29 Think, for 
example, of courts sustaining sex-based classifications based on the “fact” of women’s 
natural aptitude for child-rearing and household maintenance.30 We likewise see reliance 
on “thick” facts where courts have decided cases based on the “fact” that children born to 
 
29 The identification of “facts” as including normative judgments in addition to empirical truths about 
group members is post-hoc.  At the time they are relied upon, these “facts” often are so deeply naturalized 
by the surrounding society that they are believed by both courts and the surrounding society to be 
empirical.  Only later, when perceptions of group members change, do the normative judgments reflected 
in these facts come to be seen, and, often, rejected by courts.  Cf. Charles W. Mills, The Racial Polity, in 
RACISM AND PHILOSOPHY 13, 18-19 (Susan E. Babbitt & Sue Campbell eds., 1999) (“The point is . . . that a 
political philosophy necessarily involves factual (descriptive and theoretical) assumptions as well as 
normative claims about the polity, and if the former are not explicitly stated and highlighted as integral to 
the political philosophy, it is often simply because they are part of the conservative, background ‘common 
sense’ that its proponents take for granted.”). 
Courts are not merely passive players here, however.  By selecting among facts, they reinforce 
perceptions that those facts are true, even when they are not empirically supportable.  In Bradwell v. 
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872), for example, Justice Bradley’s concurrence, which stressed that women were 
unsuited for employment outside the home in light of their domestic natures and responsibilities, not only 
rested on but also reinforced an inaccurate perception of women as purely domestic at a time when many 
women were employed in the labor force.  Id. at 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).  Further, some 
would argue that courts deploy norms as facts strategically to avoid the conflict associated with supporting 
controversial norms.  See infra Part V. 
30 Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art29
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interracial couples are sickly31 or the “fact” that people with mental retardation are 
“manifestly unfit.”32 
“Thin” facts, on the other hand, are non-evaluative, empirical, and largely 
uncontested.33 Yet in adjudication, they often stand in for a set of unarticulated 
judgments about the social group in question.  For example, in Nguyen v. INS, the 
Supreme Court relied on the mother’s role in childbirth to sustain an immigration law that 
made it easier for U.S. citizen mothers than U.S. citizen fathers to have citizenship 
conferred on their foreign-born children.34 That empirical fact, reasoned the Court, made 
it more likely for mothers than fathers to develop the “real, everyday ties that provide a 
connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.”35 Yet the 
 
31 Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869). 
32 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
33 Certain types of “thin” empirical facts are subject to change, such as demographic data about the 
activities of social group members in the workplace and in society at large.  To the extent normative 
judgments about group members’ status and capacity function as limitations on group members’ 
opportunities, we can expect to see changes to economic and other indicators of the role of group members 
in society as those norms shift.  Others, such as facts related to biology and reproduction, are ordinarily 
unaffected by social change. 
34 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001).  For purposes of the analysis here, I am setting aside the obvious point that 
childbirth itself provides evidence of parentage, placing women in a different position from men.  I do so 
because although the majority found this evidentiary justification supported the rule, it separately accepted 
the government’s argument that mothers, by virtue of giving birth, are more likely than fathers to develop a 
meaningful relationship with the child.  Id. at 64-65. 
35 Id. at 65.  Some evolutionary biologists would point to gendered differences in endocrinology, including 
women’s capacity for lactation, to argue that women’s child-nurturing orientation is a fact, not a norm.  
However, the methodological assumptions that support the equation of biology with nurturing instinct are 
highly contested in ways that the fact of lactation (or childbirth) is not.  For that reason, perhaps, 
contentions regarding endocrinological differences are not the sort of facts on which courts tend to rely to 
justify sex-based rules.  The same is true for the contentions regarding ethnic differences in cognitive 
ability espoused in The Bell Curve and similar literature; while the conclusions are offered as empirical 
fact, they have not received wide acceptance as such, at least in part because of the contested methodology 
underlying them.   
Some would argue that normative commitments to equality override society’s (and courts’) 
willingness to consider “real,” empirical differences based on race or sex, among other characteristics.  
Others would maintain that the methodology these authors utilize to reach conclusions regarding racial 
differences in intelligence is itself embedded with the normative presumptions it purports to prove.  On 
either view, because the alleged facts are not widely considered uncontestable, they lack the credibility-
preserving function that uncontested facts bring to judicial analysis.  See infra Part IV.  For related debate 
arising from the statements of Lawrence Summer regarding the relationship between sex and scientific 
aptitude, compare, e.g., Olivia Judson, Op-Ed, Different but (Probably) Equal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2005, 
§ 4, at 17, with W. Michael Fox & Richard Alm, Op-Ed, Scientists Are Made, Not Born, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
28, 2005, at A19.   
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biology of childbirth and demographic statistics related to childrearing could not do the 
probative work for which they were relied on by the Court.  As the Court itself 
recognized previously, neither “inherent” nor demographic differences between men and 
women alone can justify sex-based rules.36 The reason for sustaining one distinction and 
rejecting another lay not in empirical facts related to biology or demography, in other 
words, but instead in normative judgments regarding the legal relevance of these “thin” 
factual differences between men and women.37 
We also see the work of “thin” facts in the marriage cases mentioned earlier, 
where courts have relied on the biological facts of procreation to justify the exclusion of 
gay couples from marriage.38 As was true for the facts related to childbirth in Nguyen,
the empirical facts of procreation themselves cannot explain the legal distinction between 
gay and non-gay people in marriage law.  Instead, they stand in for an unarticulated 
social norm—heterosexuals deserve greater respect in the form of legal recognition of 
their relationships because they can procreate unassisted—that in turn is relied on to 
support the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.39 
36 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (holding that “‘[i]nherent differences’ between 
men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the 
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity”); Wengler v. Druggists 
Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (holding that wives’ greater financial dependence on their 
husbands could not justify a sex-based workers’ compensation rule regarding death benefit eligibility); see 
also infra text accompanying notes 115-118. 
37 As will be explained in Part II.A, infra, dissenters often highlight the presence of unspoken mediating 
norms in majority opinions.  This was true in Nguyen, where Justice O’Connor accused the majority of 
allowing gendered stereotypes of women as mothers to control the analysis.  533 U.S. at 87 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).  See also infra text at notes 57-60. 
38 See, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 266-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (citing approvingly the 
opinions of several courts that “rejected challenges to the constitutionality of the limitation of marriage to 
members of the opposite sex [by relying] upon the role that marriage plays in procreation and in providing 
the optimal environment for child rearing”). 
39 If facts rather than norms actually controlled the analysis, we would expect to see all, or at least most, 
marriage cases treat procreation in the same way.  Yet we do not, as courts take different positions 
regarding whether the same empirical facts are legally significant for purposes of defining access to 
marriage.  See infra notes 146-152 and accompanying text. This diversity of opinions confirms that it is 
not biology but rather social judgments regarding biological facts that make the analytic difference . 
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Part II elaborates the operation of fact-based adjudication in contested normative 
arenas.  The discussion first maps the judicial inclination to focus on “new” facts about 
the social group at issue while leaving normative underpinnings of decisions 
unacknowledged.  I then show how fact-based decisions accrete to form the foundation 
for later cases in which norm shifts are acknowledged openly.  Against this background, 
Part III considers the role of social science and social movements within the fact-based 
adjudication model. 
Part IV takes up the theoretical inquiry into why courts tend to respond societal 
change through declarations of fact rather than analysis of shifting norms.  Two dominant 
theories of judicial review form the backdrop for the analysis.  At one end of the 
spectrum are the legitimacy and capacity constraints highlighted by legal process 
theory.40 To the extent they actually control courts’ behavior, the constraints reinforce 
that judges are limited in their ability to identify accurately popular norms regarding 
social groups.  While these capacity limitations also render fact selection difficult, the 
normative choices involved in sifting among competing facts about a social group remain 
largely unexposed in a jurisprudence that accepts fact-based decisions as legitimate.  
When courts declare norms, by contrast, they necessarily expose their normative 
commitments.  Similarly, decision-making based on facts ordinarily does not trigger the 
countermajoritarian concerns regarding judicial legitimacy that arise when a court rejects 
a popular norm and appears to be displacing the majority’s views with its own.41 From 
this vantage point, the fact-based approach to decision-making can be understood, in part, 
as a limitations-respecting, reputation-protecting tool.   
 
40 See infra notes 168-169 and accompanying text. 
41 These same concerns can arise when a court affirms a popular norm and appears inappropriately to be 
substituting majoritarian preferences for meaningful review. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, fact-based decision-making can be understood 
through the lens of legal realism as an instrumental tool for masking decisions driven by 
ideology or other preferences.  From this perspective, fact-based decisions are more 
desirable than norm pronouncements not because they actually respond to legitimacy and 
capacity constraints but because they minimize a court’s risk of being criticized for 
overstepping its role.   
A third possibility is that the focus on facts simply reflects the psychological 
processes by which human beings absorb societal change.  After all, changing norms 
about social groups frequently are experienced as changed perceptions of the capacity of 
group members.  Until the “thick” normative facts collide with a contrary, observable 
reality, many judges, like their peers, are unable to see the normative assumptions 
embedded in so-called natural facts.   We see this in the evolution of jurisprudence 
regarding African Americans, in which both courts and the surrounding society came to 
understand that bias had shaped the “fact” of racially-rooted intellectual and physical 
inferiority that had long justified legal burdens on African-Americans.42 But this theory, 
by itself, is inadequate to explain judicial fact avoidance.  While some courts may be 
unaware of the norms reflected in their opinions, as the Nguyen majority purported to be, 
other courts deciding hotly contested cases, such as Brown and Romer, surely are not. 
Indeed, while all these theories may carry some weight, they all require 
supplementation.  The fact-based approach to adjudication also must be understood, I 
argue, as a means for preserving judicial power.  By avoiding identification of underlying 
norms, courts issuing fact-based opinions retain freedom to engage with future cases on 
factual grounds and reduce the likelihood that the norm reflected in earlier decisions will 
 
42 Mills, supra note 29, at 14-17 (discussing the work of “low-level empirical assertions”). 
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have to be carried over into the new case.  The risk of normative overcommitment via 
stare decisis, in other words, is minimized.43 We see this, for example, in the early 
women’s rights cases.  While recognizing women’s equality to men in particular 
contexts, through fact-based decisions, as in Reed, fact-based decision-making preserved 
room for the Court to test and refine its commitment to sex equality over time.   
Part V evaluates the benefits and costs that would flow from greater judicial 
candor regarding the normative judgments embedded in courts’ fact-based adjudication.  
Beyond the general desirability of honesty, candor potentially would bring the benefit of 
heightening pressure on courts to reconcile, or at least explain, conflicting views of social 
groups embedded in similar cases.  Distinguishing one sex discrimination claim from 
another, for example, is far easier when facts, rather than norms, appear to be decisive.  
Likewise, procreation can glibly justify distinctions between men and women in one 
context and not another only if norms regarding procreation and the privileging of 
different-sex couples’ relationships remain undeclared.  Conceivably, too, exposure of 
the normative underpinnings of judicial review may constrain some judges from 
exercising result-oriented inclinations in cases where few legitimate, politically palatable 
rationales support the selected norms.  In addition, advocates for social change arguably 
would be better off challenging clearly expressed rationales than assailing empirical facts 
that stand in for unexpressed negative judgments regarding social group members.   
To the extent norm identification is possible, I conclude, nonetheless, that it is not 
necessarily desirable as a general rule.  As a matter of legal process and institutional 
design, fact-based decisions foster dynamic interaction among courts, majoritarian 
 
43 While normative overcommitment can also be avoided by establishing narrow norms, the discussion 
below illustrates the relative difficulty of doing so.  See infra text accompanying notes 197-199.  Even 
narrowed norms require a level of explicitly normative defense that fact-based decisions avoid. 
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branches, and the general public.  So long as decisions are fact-centered and uncommitted 
to particular norms, room remains for legislatures to move incrementally and for 
extrajudicial sources, including social science and social movements, to contribute their 
insights and positions related to both fact selection and underlying norms.  Conversely, 
constitutionalization of norms leaves less opportunity exists for extrajudicial settlement.   
At the same time, however, unqualified acceptance of the fiction inherent in fact-
based adjudication is unacceptably disingenuous and deceptive.  A move to treat facts as 
less than fully explanatory, even without pressure for detailed norm identification, could 
encourage more explicit, serious efforts to reconcile the continued force of negative 
norms about a social group in some contexts but not others.   
Without free reign for fact-based decision-making, courts adjudicating marriage 
cases, for example, could not proceed as if they were in a factual vacuum when assessing 
the relationship between procreative capacity and marriage.  Instead, candor would 
require overt consideration of whether procreative capacity has been treated as a relevant 
distinction between gay and non-gay people in related contexts, like custody, visitation, 
and second-parent adoption.  While candor would not compel a particular outcome on the 
question of marriage (or any other issue), it would discourage the judicial elision of 
normative judgments that takes place relatively freely under the cover of fact-based 
adjudication.    
Stepping back, we can see that whether courts affirm or reject tradition, rulings on 
social group claims involve selections among norms even when the reasoning related to 
norms remains unarticulated.  When courts sustain existing laws over challenges by 
social groups that traditional justifications are no longer valid, their decisions must be 
understood as strengthening the claim of the traditional norm, and not as neutral 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art29
17
avoidance of the public debate.  When stripped of the cover of the fact-based adjudication 
fiction, affirmation of tradition is thus neither a neutral or non-invasive approach to 
judicial review, notwithstanding protests to the contrary.  While other good reasons may 
exist to affirm tradition, the claim that rejection of social change-based claims is 
necessarily more respectful of the judiciary’s limited, non-majoritarian role should not be 
counted among them.  
 
I.  The Pervasive Practice of Fact-Based Decision-Making 
Facts about social groups tend to dominate judicial opinions reviewing limitations 
on group members’ rights.  Yet facts are only a small part of the analysis necessary to 
answer the standard constitutional inquiry whether a restriction on group members’ rights 
can be justified.44 Normative judgments about the weight to be accorded to facts that 
distinguish social groups play the critical role, even though they typically appear in the 
guise of facts or are ignored altogether.45 
A.  “Thin” Facts and Unstated Norms 
Most facts will, on their own, be unable to tell us (or courts) whether the singling 
out of a social group for a legal burden is reasonable.  The fact that people with mental 
retardation learn differently than others, for example, does not, in itself, justify a 
limitation of rights.  The fact that women can give birth likewise does not itself justify 
rules treating women differently from men.  So too the fact that same-sex couples cannot 
 
44 Heightened scrutiny will place greater demands on the fit between the government action and the 
characteristic of the group but the question whether a salient difference exists between members and non-
members is the same. 
45 While empirical facts play a leading role for the majority in this type of case, the dissent, if there is one, 
does not accord them the same centrality.  See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.  For clarity, 
references to judicial opinions throughout the article encompass majority and unanimous opinions unless 
otherwise indicated.    
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conceive a child without third-party assistance does not tell us whether gay and lesbian 
couples may legitimately be excluded from marriage. 
We need more information—specifically, we need the social judgments 
associated with these empirical facts to determine whether the factual difference between 
group members and others should be permitted to justify the legal restriction imposed.  
With respect to mental retardation, for example, we might conclude that the limitation on 
information processing capacity justifies less restrictive involuntary institutionalization 
rules than are imposed on people with mental illness.46 Or we might conclude that the 
difference, while uncontestable as a factual matter, is not important for this purpose.47 
We can see this, likewise, with respect to the facts of childbirth and conception.  None of 
these facts that we conventionally think of as science-based or empirical automatically 
generate either conclusion. 
The point, simply put, is that empirical facts and the social norms related to them, 
while often seen as inextricably related, are actually separate strands of information.48 I
belabor the point, though it is an obvious one, because courts tend to ignore it while 
holding out empirical facts, alone, as sufficient to justify legal rules that distinguish 
between social groups.  In Heller v. Doe, for example, the Court did precisely that, citing 
facts about mental retardation related to the timing and methods of diagnosis to justify a 
lower standard of proof for involuntary commitment of people with mental retardation 
 
46 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (sustaining a Kentucky statute making it easier for the state to 
institutionalize involuntarily a person with mental retardation than a person with mental illness). 
47 See id. at 335-49 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
48 Norms themselves also should be understood as comprised of multiple judgments, even when they 
appear to express a broad, unilateral view of a characteristic or form of conduct.  When the norm is well-
settled, the individual strands of judgment remain unseen.  But if the general norm is contested and 
becomes destabilized, the strands become relevant as some specific norms fall away while others retain 
their force.  A general norm disapproving homosexuality, for instance, may be comprised of several 
specific strands—some disapproving adult relationships with children as parents or teachers; others related 
to valuing non-gay partnerships over gay partnerships; and still others related to disapproval of gay people 
as tenants or employees.  As the broad norm becomes destabilized, some strands will carry greater force 
than others, as will be discussed in greater detail below.    
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than people with mental illness.49 “Kentucky’s basic premise that mental retardation is 
easier to diagnose than is mental illness has a sufficient basis in fact,”50 the Court 
concluded.  Similarly, the fact of childbirth became the focal explanation for the sex-
based citizenship rule in Nguyen.51 Likewise, the facts of procreation have been relied 
upon to validate the exclusion of gay couples from marriage.52 
In treating an empirical fact as proof of the reasonableness of a related law, courts 
relegate the social norm, which is doing the actual probative work, to a behind-the-scenes 
role.53 In Heller, for example, something more than different processing skills had to be 
at issue to sustain the different institutionalization rules; after all, that same information-
processing difference did not justify the zoning rule in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center that singled out for burdensome treatment a group home for people with 
mental retardation.54 In the marriage context, a negative judgment about the status or 
worth of gay people relative to non-gay people must likewise operate to justify a state’s 
refusal to let gay couples marry.  The difference in procreative capacity alone does not 
mandate the exclusion; if it did, we would not expect to see either a diversity of opinions 
in marriage cases or the many legal regimes outside marriage that do not differentiate 
based on sexual orientation.  So too for the fact of childbirth in Nguyen. Sometimes 
women’s capacity to give birth matters; sometimes it does not—a norm that gives social 
meaning to the fact in context, not a fact alone, must explain the difference.   
 
49 Heller, 509 U.S. at 321-23. 
50 Id. at 322; see also id. at 323 (“Mental retardation is a permanent, relatively static condition, [] so a 
determination of dangerousness may be made with some accuracy based on previous behavior.”); id. at 324 
(“The prevailing methods of treatment for the mentally retarded, as a general rule, are much less invasive 
than are those given the mentally ill.”).  More generally, the Court concluded that the “distinction between 
the mentally retarded and the mentally ill” is a matter of “commonsense.”  Id. at 326-27. 
51 See supra text accompanying notes 33-37. 
52 See infra text accompanying notes 211-218.  
53 As will be elaborated below, there is a set of cases in which norms are declared to be decisive.  But this 
generally occurs when a norm is thought to be well-settled by virtue of earlier opinions or positive law, 
which avoids or at least moderates concerns about judicial overreaching.  See infra Part I.B.   
54 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 450-51 (1985).  
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These judgments about group members’ capacity or status are able to go 
unmentioned as they fill in the pieces between the facts about a group and a restrictive 
law limiting group members’ rights only because of a widespread legal fiction.  This 
fiction—that empirical facts can lead directly to judgments—enables courts to engage in 
a form of judicial notice through which they incorporate the social overlay given to 
empirical facts.  Unlike ordinary judicial notice, however, which requires transparency 
regarding assumptions made by courts, judicial assumptions regarding social norms 
generally go unmentioned.  The fiction of fact-based adjudication thus enables hosts of 
normative determinations about the capacity and status of social groups to operate both 
unidentified by and undefended in majority opinions even as they determine the analysis. 
The work of these norms is often made explicit by dissents, which regularly 
identify and challenge the majority’s unspoken normative judgments.  In Heller, for 
example, Justice Souter’s dissent (for four members of the Court) conceded that 
“[o]bviously there are differences between mental retardation and mental illness,”55 but 
concluded that the factual differences could not support Kentucky’s separate rules.  
Instead, Justice Souter argued, an impermissible norm, unacknowledged by the majority, 
enabled these factual differences to be given undeserved significance.  It is “difficult,” he 
wrote, “to see [the classification, which gave family members greater control over 
institutionalization of people with mental retardation than people with mental illness] as 
 
55 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 337 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).  In addition to highlighting the norms 
that he believed to be at work, Justice Souter also disagreed with the majority’s account of empirical 
differences between mental retardation and mental illness.  See id. at 342-46 (arguing , based on social 
science literature, that treatment of people with mental retardation often involves invasive procedures, 
contrary to the majority’s contention); see also id. at 342 (“[A]ny apparent plausibility in the Court’s 
suggestion that ‘the mentally retarded in general are not subjected to [invasive mind-altering treatment] 
dissipates the moment we examine readily available material on the subject, including studies . . . cited by 
the Court.”) (internal citation omitted).   
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resting on anything other than the stereotypical assumption that the retarded are 
‘perpetual children.’”56 
The dissenters in Nguyen similarly criticized the majority’s move directly from 
empirical fact to legal conclusion via an unacknowledged (and, according to the dissent, 
impermissible) norm.57 They stressed the lack of automaticity between the empirical fact 
(women give birth to children) identified as decisive by the majority and the sex-based 
citizenship rule that imposed a lesser burden on mothers than fathers.58 “The physical 
differences between men and women . . . do not justify [the statute’s] discrimination,” 
O’Connor wrote.59 She added that the majority could connect the two and sustain the 
challenged law only by overlaying the empirical fact of childbirth with the normative 
view that women have a stronger instinct to parent than men. 
The claim that [the statute] substantially relates to the achievement of the 
goal of a “real, practical relationship” . . . finds support not in biological 
differences but instead in a stereotype—i.e., “the generalization that 
mothers are significantly more likely than fathers . . . to develop caring 
relationships with their children.”  Such a claim relies on “the very 
stereotype the law condemns,” “lends credibility” to the generalization, 
and helps convert that “assumption” into “a self-fulfilling prophecy.”60 
And this normative view, she contended, was impermissible.   
 
56 Id. at 348.    
57 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74-97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 88-89. 
59 Id. at 87 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).  To strengthen the case that an impermissible 
traditional norm had been applied, Justice O’Connor situated the law historically, declaring it 
“paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with responsibility, and freed men from responsibility, 
for nonmarital children.”  Id. at 92 (citing to legislative history).  
 The dissenters also rejected the majority’s fact-based conclusion that more evidence of parenthood 
is needed from fathers than mothers because the evidence of pregnancy and childbirth is missing.  See id. at 
81-82 (“[A] mother will not always have formal legal documentation of birth because a birth certificate 
may not issue or may subsequently be lost. Conversely, a father’s name may well appear on a birth 
certificate. While it is doubtless true that a mother’s blood relation to a child is uniquely ‘verifiable from 
the birth itself’ to those present at birth, the majority has not shown that a mother’s birth relation is 
uniquely verifiable by the INS, much less that any greater verifiability warrants a sex-based, rather than a 
sex-neutral, statute.”) (internal citation omitted). 
60 Id. at 88-89 (internal citations omitted). 
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Romer v. Evans61 illustrates the point as well, although in Romer the dissent 
highlighted a norm that, in its view, should have overlaid the majority’s analysis and 
validated the challenged Colorado ban on antidiscrimination protections for lesbians, gay 
men and bisexuals.  The majority had pinned its rejection of the government’s proffered 
rationales62 on their lack of connection to empirical facts, finding the ban to be “a status-
based enactment divorced from any factual context” that might support its legitimacy.63 
The dissent argued, in response, that the majority had improperly disregarded a legitimate 
norm—“moral disapproval of homosexual conduct” —that could have established a 
connection between the empirical facts and Colorado’s distinction between gay and non-
gay people.64 
B.  “Thick” Facts And The Merger of Norm Into “Fact” 
Sometimes, in contrast to the “thin” empirical facts described in the preceding 
discussion, “facts” about a social group on which courts rely actually do justify, as a 
logical matter, restrictions on group members’ rights.  The “facts” that people with 
mental retardation are “socially inadequate” and “manifestly unfit,” for example, could 
reasonably support the conclusion that the state may sterilize them.65 Similarly, the 
“fact” that women are naturally domestic itself justifies restrictions on women’s role in 
the workplace.66 Likewise, the “fact” that gay people are less adequate than non-gay 
people to parent children supports a ban on adoption by lesbians and gay men.67 
61 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
62 Id. at 635 (describing the rationales as “respect for . . . the liberties of landlords or employers who have 
personal or religious objections to homosexuality” and “interest in conserving resources to fight 
discrimination against other groups”). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
65 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
66 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J. concurring). 
67 See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Svcs., 358 F.3d 804, 819 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(characterizing parenting by a mother and father as the “optimal social structure” for childrearing), reh’g en 
banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). 
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Yet these “facts” have explanatory bite precisely because they contain judgments 
under the pretense of empiricism.  Put another way, while they are put forward as truths, 
which would suggest they are subject to observation-based verification, they are actually 
evaluative, and not merely descriptive, of the social group in question.   
This is not to suggest that courts are necessarily conscious that the thick facts on 
which they rely are embedded with normative judgments.  To the contrary, during the 
time that they are thought of as fact rather than norm, these “facts” are frequently 
understood as natural attributes of the affected social group.  Normative judgments, in 
other words, have great power to shape perceptions of fact.  The “fact” that women were 
seen as naturally better suited than men to care for home and hearth is illustrative.  For 
many courts (and the surrounding society),68 the empirical fact of women’s greater 
likelihood to be primary caregivers for children evidenced not just a demographic reality 
but also a “truth” ordained by nature that woman’s place was in the home.69 From this 
“natural” fact, all sorts of distinctions between men and women reasonably could be 
sustained.70 
The conflation of fact and norm into normative fact typically becomes apparent 
only after perceptions of the status or capacity of social group members have shifted.  
When the reality of women’s lives could no longer be reconciled with the image of 
women as helpless and ignorant, for example, the normative, gendered nature of the 
 
68 As Michael Klarman has observed, judges typically share the normative views (and, consequently, the 
perceptions of norms as fact) that are popular in the elite social circles in which they live and work.  See 
Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 189-91 (1998). 
69 This conversion of a demographic fact into “natural” truth about a social group was selective, of course.  
Demographic research also showed that many women—particularly women who were not white or married 
to wealthy men—worked outside the home.  Yet courts disregarded these other facts in making 
determinations about women’s capacity.   
70 See, e.g., Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141-42 (Bradley, J. concurring); Gosaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-66 
(1948) (validating Michigan’s sex-based restrictions for liquor licenses).   
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presumptions underlying assertions of women’s natural domesticity became clear.71 
Until that time, though, normative facts and empirical facts tend to function 
indistinguishably in the eyes of courts. 
Some of the most striking uses of normative facts to justify legal burdens on 
social groups appear in early race discrimination cases, where normative judgments about 
African Americans were treated as facts that proved the legal relevance of racial 
differences.   In 1867, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained the state’s 
antimiscegenation law on the ground that “[t]he natural separation of the races is . . . an 
undeniable fact.”72 By treating the normative conclusion about racial separation as 
“natural,” the court facilitated a logical flow between the “facts” and the challenged 
law.73 
Around the same time, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the state’s 
antimiscegenation statute based on “[o]ur daily observation . . . that the offspring of these 
unnatural connections are generally sickly and effeminate, and that they are inferior in 
physical development and strength, to the fullblood of either race.”74 Sustaining a similar 
law in 1883, the Missouri Supreme Court pointed to the “well authenticated fact that if 
the issue of a black man and a white woman, and a white man and a black woman, 
intermarry, they cannot possibly have any progeny.”75 
Analogous deployments of normative facts appear in cases involving social 
groups defined by sex, mental retardation and sexual orientation, among other 
 
71 Some evolutionary biologists would point to gendered differences in endocrinology and the capacity for 
lactation to argue that women’s domestic orientation is a fact, not a norm.  As mentioned earlier, however, 
courts do not rely on these facts as the basis for sex-based differential treatment.  See supra note 35.   
72 West Chester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 213 (1867) (emphasis added). 
73 See id. at 213-14 (defending decision as “not prejudice, nor caste, nor injustice of any kind, but simply to 
suffer men to follow the law of races . . . and not to compel them to intermix contrary to their instincts”). 
74 Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869). 
75 State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883).   
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characteristics.  A few additional illustrations are offered here to flesh out the work of 
these “thick” facts.   
In the context of sex-based distinctions, Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion in 
Bradwell v. Illinois76 is perhaps the most familiar example of a norm operating as fact.  
From the “fact” of “[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the 
female sex,”77 Justice Bradley concluded that women were “unfit[] . . . for many of the 
occupations of civil life,” including the practice of law.78 Famously too, the Supreme 
Court in Muller v. Oregon79 converted the demonstrable fact of biological sex differences 
into the normative fact of women’s physical limitations.   
The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by 
each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long continued labor, 
particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future 
well-being of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and 
in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence.80 
From these “facts,” the conclusion that restrictions on women’s labor were permissible 
flowed logically:  “This difference justifies a difference in legislation, and upholds that 
which is designed to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her.”81 
76 83 U.S. 130 (1872). 
77 Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).    
78 Id. In doing so, he also commingled empirical facts, like the law of coverture, along with other “facts” 
like “the law of the Creator” to reinforce his conclusion about women’s capacity.  Id. 
79 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
80 Id. at 422.  Justice O’Connor’s point in Nguyen, discussed above, was that the Court had again taken 
physical differences between men and women and imputed them impermissibly with normative 
significance to justify upholding differential sex-based rules.  See supra text accompanying notes 57-60. 
 State courts took an approach to women’s and men’s physical differences similar to that of the 
Muller majority.  Calling on received wisdom about women’s physical capacities, the New York Court of 
Appeals observed that “no one doubts that as regards bodily strength and endurance, [woman] is inferior 
and that her health in the field of physical labor must be specially guarded by the state.”  People v. Charles 
Schweinler Press, 108 N.E. 639, 640 (N.Y. 1915).  In an earlier ruling in the Washington Territory, the 
territorial supreme court likewise pointed to physical differences between men and women to bolster the 
normative fact that women lacked the sort of competence required of grand jurors.  Harland v. Territory, 3 
Wash. Terr. 131 (1887).  Jury duty, the court wrote, imposed a responsibility “so onerous and burdensome” 
that it was “utterly unsuited to the physical constitution of females.”  Id. at 140.   
81 Muller, 208 U.S. at 422-23.  The power of this gendered normative fact to rationalize a restriction on 
women’s work hours may help explain how the Court could have sustained that law while striking down on 
contractual freedom grounds nearly all other protective legislation that came before the Court in the same 
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 Buck v. Bell82 illustrates the similar operation of norms-as-facts in connection 
with mental retardation.  In upholding the Virginia law authorizing sterilization of 
“mental defectives” on due process grounds, Justice Holmes, in his brief opinion, did not 
discuss mental retardation in terms of its empirical effect on intellectual capacity.83 
Instead, consistent with the views of the day and his own views, he treated as fact that 
people with mental retardation were potential “menace[s],” “manifestly unfit,” and more 
prone to crime and dependence on public support than others.84 In other words, the fears 
and related normative judgments about the dangers of people with mental retardation that 
were popular at the time were presented as empirical fact.85 As a result, the analytic 
move from fact to justification was perfectly logical; the normative fact itself did 
sufficient explanatory work to sustain the decision to sterilize Carrie Bell. 
In the context of sexual orientation, a recent Eleventh Circuit ruling actually 
conceded that the “fact” about gay people on which it relied to sustain Florida’s ban on 
 
time period.  Of course, other related factors, including a lesser tradition of contractual freedom for women 
than men also might have influenced the Court.  See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Feminist Legacy, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 1960, 1969 (2003) (book review) (stating that at the time of Muller, “[t]he Supreme Court . . 
. was not yet ready to treat women as fully equal citizens entitled to the same degree of liberty of contract 
as men.”). 
82 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
83 Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 443 n.9 (1985) (discussing four 
categories of mental retardation based on IQ scores).    
84 Buck, 274 U.S. at 206-07.  At the same time, we know that Justice Holmes was not particularly 
concerned with the accuracy of the facts before him.  “I hate facts,” he once wrote in response to Justice 
Brandeis’ suggestion that he visit textile mills in Massachusetts.  2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932 13 (Mark DeWolfe 
Howe ed., 2d ed. 1961) (1941). 
85 In his opinion in Cleburne, Justice Marshall elaborated the widespread use of normative facts about 
people with mental retardation to justify severe burdens.  As part of his historical argument for heightened 
scrutiny of mental retardation-based classifications, he noted that by the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
“leading medical authorities and others began to portray the ‘feeble-minded’ as a ‘menace to society and 
civilization . . . responsible in a large degree for many, if not all, of our social problems.’”  Cleburne, 473 
U.S. at 462 (Marshall, J., concurring).  These views then became the normative facts that guided the 
analysis in Buck v. Bell. Cf. Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 
283 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (invalidating statute premised on the assumption “that certain retarded children are 
uneducable and untrainable”). 
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adoption by lesbians and gay men was not subject to substantiation.86 Florida had argued 
that “children benefit from the presence of both a father and mother in the home” more 
than they would from two parents of the same sex.87 Although extensive expert 
testimony had contested this “fact” at trial, the court concluded that it was “one of those 
‘unprovable assumptions’ that nevertheless can provide a legitimate basis for legislative 
action.”88 Affirmation of the state’s adoption ban flowed logically from the acceptance 
of this normative fact.  After all, if gay couples are believed to be less suitable parents 
than non-gay couples, how could the state do anything other than ban gay people from 
adopting?89 The normative fact, in other words, “explained” the classification.   
In sum, the facts held out as decisive by many courts turn out to supply little of a 
decision’s reasoning.  Instead, it is the norms associated with or embedded in those facts 
that do the explanatory work in adjudication related to social groups, even as those norms 
remain unspoken. 
 
86 Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Svcs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc 
denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). 
87 Id. at 819.  This “fact” has been contested strenuously by many experts as well as the 11th Circuit’s 
dissenters from the denial of rehearing en banc.  See Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1297 (Barkett, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he fact that Florida places children for adoption with single parents directly and explicitly contradicts 
Florida’s post hoc assertion that the ban is justified by the state’s wish to place children for adoption only 
with ‘families with married mothers and fathers.’”); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the 
Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter, 66 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 159 (2001). 
88 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819-20.  The court might have been discomfited by its admission that the rationale 
on which it rested depended on gut instinct.  Shortly after acknowledging the absence of proof for its 
assumption that mothers and fathers were better for children than two mothers or two fathers, the court 
pointed to the failure of “the accumulated wisdom of several millennia of human experience . . . [to] 
discover[] a superior model” to the household headed by a mother and a father.  Id. at 820. 
 This is not the first time a court has relied on unprovable assumptions.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
specifically endorsed these sorts of assumptions in connection with obscenity, holding that “a state 
legislature may [] act on the [] assumption that commerce in obscene books, or public exhibitions focused 
on obscene conduct, ha[s] a tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial 
behavior[.]”  Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973).  The cases on which the Court relied 
for this proposition in Paris, however, concerned antitrust, securities, environmental regulation, and 
obscenity.  See id. at 61-63.  None concerned assumptions regarding social groups or the effect of aspects 
of individual identity. 
89 Of course, the same normative fact could support restrictions on gay parents other than an outright 
adoption ban.  For example, via this normative fact, Florida also could ban gay people from serving as 
foster parents, which it does not, or place gay parents at the bottom of an adoption priority list.     
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
28
II. Fact-Based Interventions in Contested Normative Terrain.   
The fiction of fact-based decision-making is at its most powerful (and most 
questionable) when invoked by courts in response to social groups’ claims that changed 
societal views require reconsideration and rejection of traditional rationales for restricting 
group members’ rights.  In these cases, courts typically remain silent regarding their 
normative positions and either embrace “new” facts about a group or hew to old ones.  
Eventually, as fact-based decisions accrete, courts appear to gain the confidence 
necessary to tip toward making norm-based decisions.  This Part will track these 
dynamics and close with consideration of the point at which norm contests become 
relevant to adjudication regarding social groups.  Later Parts will analyze the practical 
and theoretical conditions that lead courts to prefer facts to norm declarations while 
views of social groups are in contest.
A.   Intervention Via “New” Facts 
The judicial inclination toward norm avoidance where social norms are in contest 
can be seen in a wide range of cases brought by social groups maintaining that 
traditionally accepted rationales for discriminatory treatment must give way in light of 
changing social views.  Brown v. Board of Education90 is perhaps the best-known 
example of the judicial inclination to use “new” facts to justify new conclusions about 
previously settled matters while avoiding mention of the underlying norm shifts.  In 
reversing Plessy v. Ferguson’s91 separate but equal doctrine as applied to public 
education, the Court identified “modern” knowledge as its analytic linchpin:  “Whatever 
may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,
this finding [that racially segregated schooling causes harm] is amply supported by 
 
90 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
91 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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modern authority.”92 The Court also pointed to other changed facts to support its 
analysis, noting, for example, the changed “status of public education”93 and the 
heightened achievements of African Americans in professional and cultural circles.94 
Nowhere in the decision did norms regarding African Americans or racial equality 
receive mention.95 
The California Supreme Court similarly treated “new” facts regarding race as 
decisive in striking down the state’s antimiscegenation law at a time when such laws 
were widely viewed as permissible.96 The factual grounds for race discrimination in 
marriage had long been seen as well-settled:  “[T]he prohibition of intermarriage . . . 
prevents the Caucasian race from being contaminated by races whose members are by 
 
92 Brown, 347 U.S at 494. 
93 Id. at 489.  See also id. at 492-93 (“We must consider public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”). 
94 Id. at 490 (“Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences 
as well as in the business and professional world.”). 
95 In offering a rationale for Brown different from the one advanced by the Court, Charles Black 
acknowledged the Court’s reliance on facts rather than norm declarations in its opinion. 
It seems to me that the venial fault of the opinions consists in its not spelling out that 
segregation . . . is perceptibly a means of ghettoizing the imputedly inferior race.  (I 
would conjecture that the motive for this omission was reluctance to go into the 
distasteful details of the southern caste system.)  That such treatment is generally not 
good for children needs less talk than the Court gives it. 
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 430 n.25 (1959-60). 
The surrounding global political context, in which the persistence of racial segregation was 
perceived as undermining the United States’ position in the Cold War, also went unmentioned in Brown.
See Mary L. Dudziak, Josephine Baker, Racial Protest, and the Cold War, 81 J. AM. HIST. 543, 544 (1994) 
(“On one hand, the United States claimed that democracy was superior to communism as a form of 
government, particularly in its protection of individual rights and liberties; on the other hand, the nation 
practiced pervasive race discrimination. . . . The Soviet Union and the Communist press in various nations 
used the race issue very effectively in anti-American propaganda.”). 
 For illustration of state court inclinations to avoiding normative declarations that might be subject 
to contestation, see, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) (citing facts about how 
two gay men lived together as “permanent life partners” to include them within the statutory term “family” 
for purposes of succession to a rent-controlled apartment rather than addressing the issue of sexual 
orientation or marital status discrimination that underlay the attempted eviction). 
96 Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).  See also Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell:  Scientific Racism 
and the Legal Prohibitions Against Miscegenation, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 559, 601 (2000) (describing the 
court’s ruling as “the first true crack in the courts’ monolithic support for the constitutionality of 
miscegenation statutes”); see also Jackson v. State, 72 So. 2d 114 (Ala. Ct. App. 1954) (sustaining 
Alabama’s antimiscegenation statute), cert. denied, 72 So. 2d 116 (Ala. 1954); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 
749 (Va. 1955) (sustaining Virginia’s similar law). 
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nature physically and mentally inferior to Caucasians.”97 In response, the court turned to 
science to demonstrate that the once-operative facts98 had discredited normative 
underpinnings.  
The categorical statement that non-Caucasians are inherently physically 
inferior is without scientific proof.  In recent years scientists have attached 
great weight to the fact that their segregation in a generally inferior 
environment greatly increases their liability to physical ailments.99 
The court also pointed to the absence of “scientific proof that one race is superior to 
another in native ability.”100 Once it had framed the facts in this way, its rejection of the 
racial classification seemed all but mandatory.101 
Although the Court’s decision upholding the University of Michigan Law 
School’s consideration of race in admissions in Grutter v. Bollinger102 arguably involves 
the issue of affirmative action more so than the social group of African Americans or 
people of color more broadly, it similarly illustrates the judicial preference for 
intervening in contested normative territory via facts.  Rather than declare affirmative 
action to be a normatively desirable form of redress for past discrimination,103 the Court 
focused on the factual benefits derived from student diversity, as evidenced by “expert 
studies and reports entered into evidence at trial.”104 “Numerous studies show that 
 
97 Perez, 198 P.2d at 23. 
98 Cf. id. at 26 (“Out of earnest belief, or out of irrational fears, [defenders of the antimiscegenation law] 
reason in a circle that such minorities are inferior in health, intelligence, and culture, and that this 
inferiority proves the need of the barriers of race prejudice.”). 
99 Id. at 23-24.  
100 Id. at 24-25 (footnote omitted) (also observing that ‘[t]he data on which Caucasian superiority is based 
have undergone considerable re-evaluation by social and physical scientists in the past two decades.”). 
101 To support this analytic move, the court also highlighted Gunnar Myrdal’s work linking the earlier 
normative facts about race to bias in observation.  Id. at 723 n.6.  The court held out Myrdal’s observations, 
together with the scientific data just mentioned, as requiring its conclusion that previous beliefs about 
African Americans amounted to norms rather than facts.  Id. (“ ‘[T]he ordinary white American . . . has 
made an error in inferring that observed differences were innate and a part of  ‘nature’ ’ ”).      
102 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
103 Cf. Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views from the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative 
Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928 (2001). 
104 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
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student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better prepares students for an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals,’” 
the Court wrote.105 Nowhere in the opinion did the Court acknowledge the contestable 
methodological choices made by the studies on which it relied.106 
Early decisions in the contemporary women’s rights cases also illustrate this 
pattern of norm-avoidance.  Beginning with Reed v. Reed,107 numerous fact-based 
decisions reflected a commitment to women’s equality without ever acknowledging the 
shift from earlier, contrary norms.  In Reed, the Court relied on a fact (women have at 
least as much experience as men with administering estates) to reject an Idaho law that 
subordinated wives to husbands in the prioritization of estate administrators.108 It never 
mentioned, much less refuted, the traditional sex-based norm relied on by the Idaho 
Supreme Court to sustain the law:  “[N]ature itself has established the distinction” 
between men and women, the Idaho court wrote.109 Instead, through exclusive reliance 
on facts about estate administration experience, the U.S. Supreme Court sidestepped the 
traditionally accepted judgment about men and women, leaving the norm confrontation 
for another day.110 
105 Id.
106 Arguably, Justice O’Connor’s statement that the “path to leadership” must be “visibly open to talented 
and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity” to insure leaders’ “legitimacy in the eyes of the 
citizenry,” id. at 332, constitutes a norm declaration regarding the value of affirmative action.  See Brown-
Nagin, supra note 4, at 1484 (describing this statement as “the most morally focused argument for race-
conscious admissions in the majority opinion”).  However, the statement also can be read as a positive 
description of affirmative action’s effects on democracy and legitimacy, rather than as a commitment to 
affirmative action as a moral good. 
107 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
108 Id. at 76-77. 
109 Reed v. Reed, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (Idaho 1970). 
110 In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S 632 (1974), and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 419 U.S. 822 
(1974), among others, the Court similarly invalidated pregnancy-based and sex-based rules, not by 
declaring normative opposition to those sorts of legal distinctions, but instead by finding that the facts 
related to pregnancy and to child care did not support the legal restriction imposed.  This is true as well for 
cases affirming sex-based distinctions post-Reed, such as Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), and 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), in which norm declarations were largely absent from the 
majority opinion and the focus was, instead, on the factual support for the challenged rules. 
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 Romer v. Evans111 illustrates this same point with respect to sexual orientation 
classifications.  Until Romer, Bowers v. Hardwick’s declaration that homosexuality was 
rightfully the subject of moral and legislative disapproval represented the prevailing 
constitutional discourse regarding homosexuality.112 Thus, for Romer to recognize the 
claim that a state constitutional ban on antidiscrimination protections for gay people 
violated the rights of lesbians and gay men, it had to reject, or at least deviate from, the 
traditionally embraced views of gay people reflected in Bowers. Yet the majority opinion 
did not acknowledge this move.  Instead, as noted earlier, it refused to recognize the 
normative shift implicit in its decision and instead anchored its invalidation of Colorado’s 
amendment on the ban’s factual disconnect with the state’s asserted interests.113 Despite 
Justice Scalia’s objection in dissent that the traditional social norm disapproving of 
homosexuality sufficed to justify the challenged measure,114 the Romer Court avoided 
any overt engagement with that moral judgment. 
 As these cases illustrate, when breaking with tradition, the Court has led with 
facts and left norms aside.  
B.  Fact-Based Decisions as the Groundwork for Norm Declarations 
Even in light of courts’ apparent preference for fact-based decision-making in 
contested cultural arenas, it would strain credibility to suggest that courts avoid norms 
altogether.  My argument, instead, is that fact-based decision-making is the first step of a 
 
111 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
112 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)    
113 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.  The State had advanced two interests that failed the majority’s factual 
assessment:  “The primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens’ freedom 
of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious 
objections to homosexuality.  Colorado also cites its interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination 
against other groups.”  Id. 
114 “It is unsurprising that the Court avoids discussion” of the moral disapproval rationale, Justice Scalia 
wrote, “since the answer [to the question of the rationale’s applicability here] is so obviously yes.”  Id. at 
640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  See also id. at 653 (describing as legitimate the people’s desire “to prevent 
piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of Coloradans”). 
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two-step decision-making dynamic.  As numerous cases illustrate, fact-based decisions 
lay the groundwork for later declarations of normative shifts; overt rejection of traditional 
views about the worth of social groups tends to occur only after one or more fact-based 
decisions have effectively, though not explicitly, disavowed the previously embraced 
norms.  We might think of this process as involving the accretion of fact-based 
decisions—once the “new” understanding of facts has become settled, the potential 
controversy associated with judicial intervention into contested normative terrain is 
diminished.  This accretion model applies not only to review of individual cases but also, 
as I will show below, to the labeling of classifications as suspect or quasi-suspect.   
The trajectory of women’s rights cases nicely illustrates the accretion dynamic.  
Only after Reed and several additional fact-intensive opinions that sustained claims for 
sex equality did a majority of the Court openly embrace the normative value of sex 
equality.  When the Court ultimately made that commitment explicit, it treated its move 
not as declaring a “new” norm but as articulating a norm whose settlement was evidenced 
by earlier (fact-based) decisions.  For example, in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual 
Insurance Co.,115 the Court found that women’s disproportionate financial dependence on 
their husbands could not support a workers’ compensation provision requiring widowers 
but not widows to prove dependence before recovering death benefits.116 Although that 
fact undoubtedly would have been taken to justify the different rule in the past, and, 
indeed, was treated as decisive by the lower court,117 the Court declared the devaluation 
 
115 446 U.S. 142 (1980). 
116 Id. at 151 (“It may be that there is empirical support for the proposition that men are more likely to be 
the principal supporters of their spouses and families.”).   
117 See id. at 150 (“‘[T]he substantive difference in the economic standing of working men and women 
justifies the advantage that [the law] administratively gives to a widow.’”) (quoting Wengler, 583 S.W.2d 
162, 168 (Mo. 1979)).  For discussion of earlier norms and their influence on workers compensation and 
wrongful death statutes, see JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF THE AMERICAN LAW (2004).   
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of women’s work relative to their husbands’ to conflict with a now-settled norm of sex 
equality:  “It is this kind of discrimination against working women that our cases have 
identified and in the circumstances found unjustified.”118 
The accretion phenomenon also explains the timing of announcements of 
heightened scrutiny.  These declared commitments to rigorous review of particular 
classifications have occurred only after the accretion of a series of fact-based decisions 
regarding the social group in question.119 Once earlier decisions are in place, the 
Supreme Court appeared to reach a comfort level that serious contestation of the social 
group’s status relative to its counterpart group has passed.  Heightened scrutiny, in other 
words, signals the settlement of the “new” norm, at least from the Court’s perspective.120 
This trajectory—of fact-based cases first and norm declarations thereafter—also helps 
explain why the Court appeared to be applying heightened scrutiny in cases involving 
both sex and illegitimacy classifications before it acknowledged that it was doing so.121 
118 Wengler, 446 U.S. at 147.   See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975) (holding that 
facts related to women’s workforce participation “certainly put to rest the suggestion that all women should 
be exempt from jury service based solely on their sex and the presumed role in the home”); Stanton v. 
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) (invalidating sex-based child support rule based on judicial notice of 
“[t]he presence of women in business, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life” 
and the related conclusion that “[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the 
family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas”).  
119 Heightened scrutiny, after all, represents a deviation from court’s ordinary orientation toward norm 
avoidance as it reflects an explicit commitment to an equality norm regarding the designated social group 
characteristic. 
120 This point is somewhat more complicated with respect to racial classifications than with respect to the 
sex classifications discussed below.  For one, some version of a race equality norm was acknowledged by 
courts almost immediately after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments.  See Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 303-08 (1879).  At the same time, however, this recognition did not translate into 
broad skepticism of racial classifications.  See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896).  Further, 
even after the Court first characterized race as a “suspect” ground for classification in Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), the Court did not begin actual rigorous review of racial classifications for 
another twenty years.  See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (stressing the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “strong policy” against racial classifications); see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality 
Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 496-503 (2004) (analyzing evolution of suspect classification 
analysis); Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 
232 (1991) (same).   
121 Many scholars have maintained that the Court had been applying heightened scrutiny to sex 
classifications since Reed. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-26 (2d ed. 
1988); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword:  In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
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Once heightened scrutiny has been declared, an equality norm begins to displace 
or reshape consideration of facts in adjudication.  In United States v. Virginia,122 for 
example, the Court overrode perceived factual differences between men and women and 
relied on a sex equality norm to invalidate Virginia Military Institute’s sex-based 
admission policy.123 Likewise, in J.E.B. v. Alabama,124 the Court recognized possible 
differences between male and female jurors but rejected sex-based peremptory strikes on 
equality grounds.125 This is not to suggest that the sex equality norm always carries the 
day, as Nguyen and other cases show.126 But, as in Wengler and Virginia, among others, 
the application of heightened scrutiny illustrates a willingness to engage in overt norm-
based adjudication in a way that does not take place when norms are perceived to be 
unsettled.    
The accretion phenomenon is not limited to classifications that are ultimately 
subjected to heightened scrutiny.  Among sexual orientation cases, for example, we can 
explain the relationship among Bowers v. Hardwick,127 Romer v. Evans,128 and Lawrence 
v. Texas129 through this lens.  In all three cases, the baseline question was whether 
anything about homosexuality justified the state’s limitation of gay people’s rights.  In 
Bowers, the Court treated social norms condemning homosexuality as sufficiently settled 
 
Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1972).  The Court 
likewise appeared to be applying intermediate scrutiny to classifications of nonmarital children long before 
its formal pronouncement of quasi-suspect classification status for those classifications in 1988.  See Clark 
v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Gunther, supra, at 33-36. 
122 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
123 See id. at 533-34 (finding that “inherent differences between men and women” did not justify 
constraints on women’s opportunities and that sex-based classifications “may not be used, as they once 
were, [] to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”) (citations and 
punctuation omitted). 
124 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
125 Id. at 138-42. 
126 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding a statute 
that subjected only men to criminal liability for statutory rape). 
127 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
128 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
129 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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so that they could be stated, without more, as the justification for Georgia’s sodomy 
law.130 Then in Romer, as discussed earlier, the Court rested its rejection of Colorado’s 
antigay ban on facts and avoided mention of the Bowers-approved norm.131 Romer then 
served as the fact-based, norm-avoidant precursor for Lawrence’s outright rejection of the 
moral disapproval norm.132 
Of course, a host of other explanations could account for the different 
adjudicative approaches of Romer and Lawrence, including the different doctrinal 
foundations of the two decisions, with Romer focused on equal protection and Lawrence 
on due process.133 The moral disapproval rationale was also the leading justification 
proffered in Lawrence while several others had been advanced more prominently in 
Romer.134 And, certainly, the outlier status of the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law as 
only one of a handful of such laws in the nation135 made the normative declaration 
relatively safe in Lawrence. But none of these factors fully explain why the Romer 
majority did not touch the moral norm advanced so forcefully by the dissent and why 
 
130 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (relying on “the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that 
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable”).  The near-universal condemnation of Bowers 
suggested that the Court had miscalculated (or deliberately misrepresented) the degree to which social 
norms regarding homosexuality were contested when it glibly asserted the moral disapproval rationale and 
brushed off Michael Hardwick’s privacy claim as “at best, facetious.”  Id. at 194.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 576-75 (citing criticism of Bowers). 
131 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
132 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (“This case raises . . . whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, moral 
disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not 
heterosexual sodomy. It is not. Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an 
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”).  Cf. 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking:  Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 
88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1281-83 (2004) (analyzing the Lawrence majority’s limited engagement with the 
moral disapproval rationale).   
133 Compare Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-35 (invalidating the Colorado amendment on equal protection 
grounds), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (stating that “the case should be resolved by determining whether 
the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution”). 
134 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-73 (analyzing morals-based government interest); Romer 517 U.S. at 
632-36 (addressing government interests related to associational freedom and scarce resources).     
135 Lawrence, 539. U.S. at 573 (stating that only four states at that time had sodomy laws targeted only at 
sexual conduct of same-sex couples). 
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Lawrence ultimately did.  The inclination toward norm avoidance when the normative 
waters appear to be unsettled, I would argue, provides at least some of that explanation.   
C. The Non-Neutrality of Fact-Based Decision-Making   
Judicial responses to norm contests are not monolithic; not always are courts 
provoked into norm-avoidance simply because a settled norm has been contested.  This 
section sets out a model for identifying the conditions under which norm contestation 
might affect adjudication,136 and offers a preliminary critique of the claim, made by many 
courts, that sustaining the status quo enables courts to remain neutral in cultural conflicts.  
I return to this point in greater depth in Part V’s consideration of the value of candor in 
adjudication.   
Most of the time, norms are so deeply integrated into society that they are unseen 
and, if seen, are understood to reflect indisputable judgments about certain aspects of 
social group members’ identity and conduct.137 The Nguyen majority’s declaration that it 
was “unremarkable” to equate women’s role in childbirth and child care is illustrative.138 
In this naturalized state, norms can go virtually unnoticed as they create links between 
empirical facts (men cannot give birth) and laws limiting social group members’ rights 
(fathers must take more steps than mothers to have citizenship conferred on their children 
even if they are present at birth).   
Even in the most homogeneous communities, however, norms rarely receive 
 
136 The framework is not intended to suggest that all norms move through all stages or that the occurrence 
of a shift is necessarily desirable from the standpoint of the social group in question.   
137 In this state, norms might be said to be at room temperature.  Much critical legal scholarship has 
concentrated on exposing the way norms blend into what is perceived as natural.  A significant body of 
feminist literature, for example, has concentrated on exposing the male bias in many naturalized norms.  
See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7-
8 (1985) (explaining the way in which “the subordination in gender inequality[] is made invisible; dissent 
from it becomes inaudible as well as rare”).  Separately, a growing body of law and economics literature 
has focused on harnessing the power of naturalized norms toward efficient or socially beneficial ends.  See, 
e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).  
138 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 66 (2001). 
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universal ratification.  Outlier groups or individuals not only defy but also seek to abolish 
or reformulate prevailing norms, invoking constitutional “principles in their own search 
for greater freedom.”139 We might think of Myra Bradwell’s challenge to Illinois’ 
attorney licensing rule or Carrie Bell’s challenge to Virginia’s sterilization rule in this 
way.   
Yet these challenges tend to have little effect on adjudicators.  Courts either see 
no contest or find that contestation too peripheral to have gained traction, and proceed as 
though nothing has occurred to destabilize the traditionally accepted facts and norms.  
Take, for example, the challenges to marriage laws brought by lesbian and gay couples in 
the 1970s and 1980s.140 At that time, movements for gay liberation and gay rights had 
made substantial headway in disrupting the view of gay people as mentally ill141 and 
some progress toward dispelling the belief that gay people were inherently inferior to 
heterosexuals, as evidenced by the passage of anti-discrimination ordinances prohibiting 
sexual orientation discrimination.142 Yet not even a tremor of these norm changes 
received recognition from any court asked to decide whether state marriage laws 
discriminated unlawfully against same-sex couples.  Instead, these marriage challenges 
were the proverbial easy cases, with arguments dismissed out of hand.143 
Some norm contests move past this relatively settled stage and tip into the 
 
139 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. 
140 See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1972) (rejecting challenge to marriage law’s 
exclusion of gay couples); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (same); Singer v. Hara, 
522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (same); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. 1984) (same). 
141 See infra note 164 (describing removal of homosexuality from the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1973).    
142 See LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL 5-6 
(1998). 
143 As Mahatma Gandhi observed, with respect to social change, “First they ignore you, then they laugh at 
you, then they fight you, then you win.”  At this early contestation stage, courts could be described as 
ignoring plaintiffs’ claims. 
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mainstream.144 Even when norm contests become so prominent that they cannot credibly 
be ignored, the inclination to avoid serious discussion of norms remains apparent.  Like 
the use of facts in other cases, courts deploy references to norm contestation strategically 
and often without elaboration, as if to direct attention away from their role in selecting 
among competing norms.  As will be developed in Part IV, this judicial norm avoidance 
may be explained by instrumental interests in a particular outcome, a sense of constraint 
on the part of judges, or, as I believe, a judicial inclination to maximize decision-making 
power.  Whatever the motivation—and whatever the decision, leaving norms 
unmentioned does not leave the public debate over norms unaffected, notwithstanding 
judicial rhetoric to the contrary.    
The current marriage challenges brought by same-sex couples are positioned in 
this norm-avoidant way and are replete with suggestions by defendants, and sometimes 
by courts, that while a norm contest may be taking place, the court’s role is to follow, 
rather than lead, the public debate.  Like the lawsuits from the 1970s and 1980s, the 
argument in the contemporary marriage cases is that changed views regarding gay people 
have undermined rationales for sexual orientation-based distinctions once thought to be 
reasonable.  Yet, even as courts are gauging whether sufficient social change has 
occurred, they go to great lengths to avoid casting themselves as deciding that norm-
related question.145 
144 Precisely when challenges to settled norms move from margin to center is, of course, difficult to 
identify with precision, as the determination depends on which evidence of contestation, empirical or 
otherwise, is valued.  See infra text accompanying notes176-188 (discussing conflicting perspectives of 
majority and dissenting opinions on the status of norms regarding the juvenile death penalty).  Further, to 
be clear, the tipping point does not suggest that contestation is entirely past but rather that a once-natural 
norm has begun to lose its dominance among the general public.  This recognition is not meant to imply a 
judgment regarding the shift’s desirability.     
145 Courts in these cases also deploy references to norm contestation in analyzing fundamental rights 
claims by same-sex couples.  See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Ct., 77 P.3d 451, 459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), 
rev. denied (2004) (“Although same-sex relationships are more open and have garnered greater societal 
acceptance in recent years, same-sex marriages are neither deeply rooted in the legal and social history of 
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At one end of the spectrum, for example, while recognizing that “[g]reat strides 
have already been made in protecting same-sex partners in New Jersey,” a New Jersey 
court wrote that “difficult social issues,” “vital debate, and delicate political negotiations” 
required it to sustain “the traditional understanding of marriage” and reject the plaintiffs’ 
challenge to the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.146 The Arizona Court of 
Appeals likewise concluded that “although many traditional views of homosexuality have 
been recast over time,” the court should leave to “the people of Arizona, through their 
elected representatives . . . to decide whether to permit same-sex marriages.”147 
At the other end, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissed as “a 
destructive stereotype” the traditional view “that same-sex relationships are inherently 
 
our Nation or state nor are they implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”).  Because analysis of 
fundamental rights claims tends to be backward looking, see Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the 
Constitution:  A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1161 (1988), only minimal focus is placed on the contemporary validity of the traditional norm that is my 
focus here.   
 Notably, whether courts affirm or reject the status quo, they take care in these cases to express 
respect for the sincerity of the views held by those whose position they reject, perhaps as a legitimacy-
preserving device consistent with their invocation of the countermajoritarian difficulty.  See, e.g., Lewis v. 
Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114, at *23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003) (“[T]he 
court is sympathetic to the interests of the plaintiffs . . . .”), aff’d 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 
2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 146 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (“This Court’s personal view [is] that 
children raised by same-sex couples enjoy benefits possibly different, but equal, to those raised by 
opposite-sex couples . . . .”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) 
(“Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical convictions that marriage should be limited to 
the union of one man and one woman . . . .”); Anderson v. King Cty., No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 
1738447, at *1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004) (“The social issue before the Court [same-sex marriage] is 
one about which people of the highest intellect, the deepest morality and the broadest public vision 
maintain divergent opinions, strongly held in good faith and all worthy of great respect.”). 
146 Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at **25-26. See also id. at *25 (“[T]he Legislature and the courts have 
taken significant steps to protect the rights of same-sex couples.”).  The court went so far as to catalogue an 
extensive series of judicial decisions and statutes providing extensive legal protection for and recognition 
of same-sex couples.  See id. at **25-26. See also id. at *23 (“Social change of the type sought by 
plaintiffs is properly accomplished in the legislative arena.”); Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858, 866 
(Sup. Ct., Tompkins County 2005) (“The decision to extend any or all of the benefits associated with 
marriage is a task for the Legislature, not the courts.  Social perceptions of same-sex civil contracts may 
change over time, and every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters 
is the best.”); Shields v. Madigan, 783 N.Y.S.2d 270, 277 (Sup. Ct., Rockland County 2004) (“It is the 
Legislature that is the appropriate body to engage in the studied debate that must necessarily precede the 
formulation of social policy with respect to same-sex marriage and the decision to extend any or all rights 
and benefits associated with marriage to same-sex couples, and, in turn, the amendment or expansion of the 
laws presently governing the institution of marriage in New York.”). 
147 Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 465. 
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unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy of respect.”148 In 
light of this norm shift, rationales once accepted to justify different marriage rules for gay 
people now must be understood to reflect impermissible “prejudices against persons who 
are . . . homosexual,” the court wrote.149 With the problem framed in this way, the court 
then fulfilled its duty as the “last instance” protector of constitutional rights and rejected 
the discriminatory marriage rule.150 One of several New York Supreme Court rulings on 
the state’s marriage law likewise treated the norm contest regarding the legal significance 
of sexual orientation differences as essentially over.151 It then characterized its 
invalidation of the state’s different-sex requirement for marriage not as staking out new 
normative territory but instead as harmonizing with norms already settled by related 
jurisprudence and positive law in New York.  Its decision, the court wrote, was 
“consistent with the evolving public policy as demonstrated in recent decisions of the 
Court of Appeals and other New York courts, and actions taken by the State Legislature, 
the executive branch and local governments.”152 
148 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003) (footnote omitted).  See also id. 
at 968 (finding that no rational basis existed to justify the state’s sex-based marriage restriction and that 
“the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are . . . homosexual”). 
 The court also repudiated a normative preference for heterosexual relationships that may have led 
other courts, albeit not overtly, to treat marriage recognition as more sacred, and therefore less subject to 
compliance with the equal protection guarantee, than other forms of state action.  “Recognizing the right of 
an individual to marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity of opposite-sex 
marriage,” the court wrote.  Id. at 965.   
149 Id. at 968. 
150 Id. at 966. 
151 Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 2005). 
152 Id. at 607.  Two other state supreme court justices disagreed, finding the contest to be sufficiently live 
that the issue of equal marriage rights for gay and lesbian couples required legislative, not judicial, 
intervention.  See supra note 146. 
A California Superior Court also looked to the norms reflected in extant state law, including a 
state law providing “marriage-like rights,” to find that no legitimate purpose could justify excluding same-
sex couples from marriage.   
California’s enactment of rights for same-sex couples belies any argument that the State 
would have a legitimate interest in denying marriage in order to preclude same-sex 
couples from acquiring some marital right that might somehow be inappropriate for them 
to have.  . . . [T]he State’s position that California has granted marriage-like rights to 
same-sex couples points to the conclusion that there is no rational basis in denying them 
the rites of marriage as well. 
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Under either framing of the norm, however, courts do not effectively absent 
themselves from the public debate.  Choosing the “old” norm over the “new” out of 
deference to the countermajoritarian difficulty neutralizes neither a court’s decision-
making agency nor the influence the decision will have on strengthening one norm over 
the other.  In the marriage cases, judicial affirmations of normative preferences for 
heterosexual couples, even if not articulated explicitly, reinforce the legitimacy of that 
traditional norm.  They supply legislators with reasons to block marriage rights for same-
sex couples and provide opponents of same-sex couples’ marriages with additional 
ballast for their claims that marriage by same-sex couples is not legitimate.  To the extent 
the trajectory of other legislative and jurisprudential changes is toward rejecting sexual 
orientation-based distinctions, a decision affirming the traditional norm derails that 
process.  Indeed, where shifts in law and policy have eliminated longstanding legal 
burdens on lesbians and gay men and have recognized the equality of gay and non-gay 
parents, courts affirming the traditional negative norm in the marriage context 
conceivably could be accused of disrupting or disrespecting the democratic process.153 
Because both affirmation and rejection of tradition requires selection among 
competing norms, the gloss of neutrality often attributed to judicial support for the status 
quo is, in short, a legal fiction much like the concept of fact-based adjudication.   So too 
is the charge that decisions rejecting traditional norms are “activist” in making normative 
judgments while those that embrace tradition are passive, having kept themselves out of 
the business of norm selection.  Consequently, to the extent concerns about a democracy 
 
In re Coordination Proceeding, Marriage Cases, Tentative Ruling, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129, at *4 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005). 
153 By the same token, courts that reject the traditional norm and harmonize marriage law with more recent 
developments that reject sexual orientation-based distinctions also are making a contestable normative 
judgment regarding the relevance of sexual orientation to marriage.  There is no question that these courts 
have an effect on the public debate.  What interests me here, however, is why courts that affirm tradition 
are not also perceived to be making contestable, influential norm selections.    
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deficit can be raised legitimately in connection with courts that are deciding cases in the 
midst of norm contests, those concerns have bite where courts affirm traditional norms as 
well as when courts affirm the displacement of traditional rationales with new norms.  
Affirming tradition, in other words, is not a neutral decision-making stance. 
 
III. The Role of Social Science and Social Movements in a Jurisprudence of 
Fact-Based Decision-Making   
 
Three observations regarding the relationship of social science and social 
movements to the transformation of facts and norms flow from the operation of fact-
based decision-making described above.154 First, social science research can destabilize 
traditional perceptions of group members’ capacity by exposing and discrediting norms 
embedded in “factual” characterizations of groups.  Most classically, courts invoke social 
science for this purpose by relying on a particular fact as “proof” to justify the outcome 
of a case, as in the Labor Department studies cited in Taylor v. Louisiana to support 
invalidation of an automatic jury service exemption for women.155 Dissenters and 
scholars regularly criticize this form of reliance on facts as selective or acontextual, yet 
these criticisms have comparatively little effect so long as the data are basically credible 
and the fiction remains in place that facts alone can determine reasonableness.156 Thus, 
 
154 For extended discussion of the relationship between courts and social science, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN,
LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 200-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE 
LAW (2004); Rachel Pine, Speculation and Reality:  The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of 
Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PENN. L. REV. 655 (1988); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8
COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).  On the relationship between courts and social movements, see, e.g., Brown-
Nagin, supra note 4; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Channeling:  Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); Edward L. 
Rubin, Passing Through the Door:  Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1 (2001); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Context:  Gender and the Constitution From a Social Movement 
Perspective, 150 PA. L. REV. 297 (2001). 
155 419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975) 
156 See infra notes 179-188 and accompanying text (discussing critiques posed by dissenters in Roper v. 
Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), regarding the process by 
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while literature aimed at showing courts how to work with social science more 
productively may be useful to the extent it assists adjudicators in sifting through and 
thinking critically about information sources, it is unlikely to overcome the judicial 
inclination to rely on data without acknowledging the normative choices involved in that 
data selection or in the methodology by which the data themselves were derived. 
A separate, potentially more effective function of social science in adjudication is 
to identify and explain how bias has shaped perceptions of group members’ status and 
capacity.  In this respect, social science can destabilize normative facts about a social 
group by revealing how misplaced normative judgments have distorted popular 
“facts.”157 Heuristic devices of cognitive psychology may be useful in showing, for 
example, that a widely accepted fact about a social group rests on faulty premises 
because researchers anchored themselves at an arbitrary starting point or ignored 
fundamentally conflicting facts.158 In connection with the same-sex marriage example 
developed earlier, cognitive psychology may add value to the analysis of the claims that 
heterosexual parents are preferable for children by raising questions about biased 
anchoring, cognitive dissonance in the evaluation of research data, and other potential 
 
which the majority moved from fact to constitutional judgment without acknowledgment of the norms that 
shaped the interpretation of evidence).    
157 Of course, the direct effect of any social scientific analyses of fact on adjudication is limited largely to 
what litigators bring to courts’ attention.  Often, this information comes to courts through amicus curiae 
briefs filed by professional organizations such as the American Psychological Association.  See, e.g., Brief 
Amicus Curiae of the Massachusetts Psychiatric Society, the American Psychoanalytic Association, the 
National Association of Social Workers, et al., filed in Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 
941 (Mass. 2003) (on file with the author). 
 Questions have been raised separately regarding the utility of cognitive psychology related, more 
broadly, to issues of institutional design.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring 
Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias:  A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616 (2002). 
158 See, e.g., David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind:  Social Influence, Fads, and Informational 
Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn Ieruli eds., 
1995) (explaining biased anchoring, cascade effects, and other phenomena). 
 Social science also may serve as a check on factual perceptions held by the general public as well 
as other researchers.  Its potential revelatory benefit separately motivates arguments in the employment 
discrimination context that decision-makers’ biases are often not apparent.  See, e.g., Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).  
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methodological flaws.159  The California Supreme Court, in striking down the state’s ban 
on interracial marriage, similarly deployed social science analysis, as well as 
epidemiological data, to enhance its argument that earlier, flawed factual perceptions 
regarding the significance of racial differences had been shaped by false normative 
presumptions.160 
Second, social movements likewise may heighten awareness of the dissonance 
between traditional views of a social group and contemporary perceptions.161 Unlike 
social science research, which can enter the courtroom as evidence, albeit in a limited 
fashion, the work of social movements is confined largely to extra-litigation activities.162 
Yet it warrants brief attention because the analytic framework advanced here helps clarify 
the movements’ particular influence on adjudication.   
Very broadly speaking, identity-based social movements aim to alter what they 
view as unfair perceptions of, and unjust laws imposed on, the group they represent.163 
Disruption of “facts” embodying negative normative judgments about group members is 
a first task of these movements.  With negative normative facts about a social group in 
place, law reform in the name of equality is virtually impossible because the facts 
 
159 See, e.g., Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 87 (discussing and critiquing studies); see also Stephen A. 
Newman, The Use and Abuse of Social Science in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
537 (2004-05). 
160 See supra text accompanying notes 96-101, discussing Perez.
161 The suggestion here that some perceptions are more accurate than others is offered with the awareness 
that the concept of accuracy itself is temporally contingent. 
162 Some social movements also have highly sophisticated legal organizations that participate directly in 
the litigation process on group members’ behalf.   See, e.g., PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE 
ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1999); JACK 
GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1995).  My focus here is not on gauging the efficacy of legal intervention in 
achieving movement goals but rather on identifying with specificity the particular ways in which the work 
of social movements may shape judicial responses to claims of societal change.  For discussion of the 
efficacy of social movements in achieving social justice goals of various constituencies,  see, e.g., RICHARD 
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY (2004); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(1991); Brown-Nagin, supra note 4; Eskridge, supra note 154. 
163 For an extensive discussion of the effects of identity-based social movements on law reform, see 
Eskridge, supra note 154; Siegel, supra note 154.  
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themselves justify ill treatment of group members.  For example, one of the first efforts 
of the contemporary gay movement was to challenge the American Psychiatric 
Association’s listing of homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder in Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.164 Absent that change, most challenges to 
government action distinguishing between gay and non-people would have been destined 
to lose because the “fact” of mental illness could justify innumerable restrictions on gay 
people’s lives.  Similarly, the “fact” that whites were more competent both physically and 
intellectually than African Americans had to be destabilized, as did the “fact” of women’s 
and men’s natural aptitude differences, before equality claims could be adjudicated 
meaningfully.   
In the current social climate, the assertion that gay people are less suitable role 
models for children than non-gay people presents a similar challenge.  To the extent the 
assertion is treated as “fact,” it follows logically that governments can restrict gay people 
from adopting or from marrying (if marriage is treated as the state’s preferred foundation 
for childrearing).  While social scientists undertake studies, social movement leaders 
undertake public education campaigns and media outreach efforts and pursue a host of 
other strategies for raising awareness of the lives of gay people in general and gay parents 
in particular.165 As with the mental illness delisting, efforts at law reform in this area can 
 
164 See Nancy J. Knauer, Science, Identity, and the Construction of the Gay Political Narrative, 12 L. & 
SEXUALITY 1, 26-27 (2003) (describing “the elimination of diagnosis” of homosexuality as a mental 
disorder as “a necessary step to secure equal rights for gay men and lesbians”); Patricia A. Cain, Litigating 
for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1582-83 (1993) (“[T]he most 
successful challenge by these new activists was the assault mounted against the American Psychiatric 
Association to remove homosexuality from its list of mental disorders. . . . Because the medical 
profession’s definitions of illness can have meaningful legal consequences, this victory within the 
American Psychiatric Association was equivalent to winning an important test case in the courts.”) 
(footnote omitted); Donald H.J. Hermann, Legal Incorporation and Cinematic Reflections of Psychological 
Conceptions of Homosexuality, 70 UMKC L. REV. 495, 541 (stating that “[t]he elimination of the stigma of 
mental disease has had a significant influence” on “recognizing the legal rights of homosexuals”). 
165 See, e.g., CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (John D’Emilio et. Al. 
eds., 2000). 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art29
47
only be successful if the negative “facts” about gay parents are denaturalized and 
discredited.    
Yet, as a third point regarding the influence of extrajudicial sources, discrediting 
perceived facts about a group is not always sufficient to eradicate legal burdens on group 
members.  While changes to perceptions of group members’ capacity may help change 
normative attitudes as well, this kind of synergistic transformation is not automatic.  In 
some instances, negative norms are so deeply rooted that they influence adjudication of 
social change-based claims even after negative facts about group members are no longer 
believable.  Courts in these cases let empirical, uncontested facts about group members 
stand in silently for norms that justify continuing limitations on group members’ rights in 
the way that “thick” facts had done before.  The “fact” that gay people are less able 
parents may no longer be credible to justify the exclusion of gay people from 
parenting,166 for example, but the empirical fact of procreative capacity continues to stand 
in to preserve the operation of the traditional disapproving norm.167 For as long as 
procreative capacity is seen to justify a preference for heterosexuality, courts will find the 
marriage exclusion justified. 
In this scenario, neither social movements nor social scientists are likely to have a 
direct effect on disrupting patterns of negative treatment of social group members.  
 
166 See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (“The father’s continuous exposure of the child 
to his immoral and illicit relationship [with another man] renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a 
matter of law.”); Pascarella v. Pascarella, 512 A.2d 715, 717 (Pa. Super. 1986) (“It is inconceivable that 
[the children] could go into that environment [where the father lived with his male partner], be exposed to 
this relationship and not suffer some emotional disturbance, perhaps severe.”) (citation omitted).  
167 This reliance on empirical rather than questionable normative facts is also evident in litigation strategy.  
For example, in defending New York’s exclusionary marriage law, the City of New York offered 
procreation as a justification for the law’s classification yet, at the same time, disavowed the position of 
disapproving gay people as parents.  As shown earlier, since procreative capacity alone cannot explain the 
law’s different treatment of gay and non-gay people, it is difficult to understand the procreation argument 
as linked to anything other than a preference for heterosexuals as parents.  Yet, for political or other 
reasons, the City apparently felt it could not embrace that position.  Consequently, it proffered the empirical 
facts of procreation to do its unspoken normative work.  Appellant’s Brief at 45, Hernandez v. Robles, No. 
103434/2004 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t filed June 27, 2005). 
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Because the norm goes unmentioned rather than being advanced explicitly as a decisive 
“fact,” it is a more elusive target than normative-factual assertions about group members.  
Further, even to the extent the norm’s operation could be isolated, the norm—as norm—
is offered as a social judgment, not a fact.  As such, it is not subject to disproof in the way 
that facts are; rational, evidentiary-based arguments by definition will not be as effective.    
Consequently, social movements are relatively helpless in challenging norms that 
silently justify continued burdens on group members after facts supporting those burdens 
have been disproved.   For similar reasons, social science is most effective at attacking 
fact-based perceptions of social groups and far less effective at destabilizing negative 
norms that persist in the wake of discredited facts.  While both have some ability to 
disrupt the norms associated with uncontested facts about group members, the diffuse 
operation of those norms and their lesser susceptibility to rational argument renders the 
effect of those efforts far less predictable.  Thus, challenges to the norms associated with 
empirical facts may be understood best as a second-order task of social movements or 
social scientists, for these attacks can begin to gain traction only if normative facts are 
displaced first.   
 
IV. Theorizing Judicial Norm Avoidance 
This Part considers the pragmatic and theoretical conditions that lead courts to 
respond to social change as a factual phenomenon before recognizing changes to norms.  
It looks, in other words, at why the pressure for constitutional tipping on issues related to 
social groups is located in perceptions of facts about group members rather than in 
perceptions of evolving norms.   
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Legal process theories, with their focus on courts’ limited capacity to gather 
information related to changing social norms and on their tenuous legitimacy relative to 
majoritarian bodies, offer one possible frame for understanding the judicial response to 
social change claims.168 Results-oriented theories offer another, with their claim that 
opinions are best understood as improvisations of a court aimed to obscure or legitimate 
an outcome that is largely unrelated to the stated reasoning.169 The discussion below 
evaluates and refines the application of these and other theories in the context of social 
change-based claims.  Remaining questions regarding the legitimacy of fact-based 
analysis relative to other approaches to adjudication will be taken up in Part V.   
If we assume, arguendo, that courts approach adjudication with genuine concern 
for their legitimacy (either in the eyes of the general public or their elite peers) and with 
recognition of their limited capacity, their preference for fact-based decision-making 
appears to be a sensible, conservative, reputation-protecting strategy for several reasons.  
First, the very project of identifying norms (and changes to those norms) has an 
intangible, almost anthropological quality to it as compared to the project of fact 
identification.  Because a norm signifies a societal judgment, determining a norm’s 
contours requires delving into the inner life of a community, a task for which courts are 
 
168 See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of 
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1996) (explaining that, under legal process theory, “the 
particular task of courts . . . is to decide cases on the basis of reasoned argument, and only issues that can 
be resolved by that approach are appropriate for judicial resolution.  When courts go beyond this role, they 
endanger their legitimacy as legal institutions—first, because they assert an unjustifiable claim to political 
superiority, and second, because they act beyond their area of competence.”); see also G. Edward White, 
The Path of American Jurisprudence, 124 PENN. L. REV. 1212, 1247-49 (1976) (discussing development of 
legal process theory).   
 Critiques of the legal process paradigm have spawned more elaborate and nuanced analysis of the 
relationship between the judiciary and the other branches.  See, e.g., Rubin, supra; Michael C. Dorf, Legal 
Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 895-96, 925-35 (2003).  
169 See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); 
MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1993).  Not 
all of these statements are critical of the underlying judgment.  See, e.g., Black, supra note 95, at 430 
(offering alternate explanation for result reached in Brown).   
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notoriously ill-suited from a legal process perspective.170 Not surprisingly, then, when 
courts talk about norms, they typically transform the inquiry from an abstract gauging of 
social sensibilities to a fact-finding project based on legislation, judicial opinions, and, on 
occasion, polling data and reports from expert organizations.  Absent consensus on the 
meaning of this information, however, the difficult normative choices inherent in 
declaring norms are inescapable and, often, not easily defended.  Although deciding 
which data are credible as an empirical matter requires only thin agreement, determining 
which empirical “evidence” should be included (e.g. do opinion polls count?) and how 
best to interpret whatever evidence makes the cut is not automatic.  Declaring norms thus 
leaves courts vulnerable to accusations that they have mistaken their own views for those 
of the majority.   
Sifting among facts and treating selected facts as decisive does not fully escape 
these sorts of problems.  Still, fact-based decision-making enables courts to take account 
of societal change while maintaining the appearance, superficially at least, of being less 
subject to manipulation based on the preferences of individual adjudicators.  In part, this 
is because the norms for which those facts stand in typically remain unmentioned.  
Moreover, facts are relatively more obvious, more measurable, and more subject to proof 
than norms.  If the observable evidence belies the normative fact that children of 
interracial couples are incapable of reproducing, for example, that reproductive “fact” 
will be destabilized and a court will have to embrace that change or risk its credibility as 
 
170 Justice Scalia made much of this judicial capacity issue in his Roper dissent.  See Roper v. Simmons, 
125 S. Ct. 1183, 1222 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  See infra text accompanying notes 182-184. 
 The rise of juries could be said to reinforce this point, to the extent that juries are understood to 
bring into the judicial process a more accurate sense of community norms than judges might bring to bear.  
On the other hand, the decline of juries might be read to suggest that courts have become more adept at 
assessing norms.  See generally WILLIAM DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S
ORIGINS, TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001). 
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a fact-finder.171 Concerns with legitimacy thus prevent courts from retaining a picture of 
a social group substantially different from the one that is known broadly, even if that 
picture is a longstanding one and the subject of the “new” facts is unpopular in the 
surrounding society.172 
The difficulty for a court in declaring norms, as opposed to facts, is well 
illustrated by two recent death penalty cases, in which the majority’s measure of this 
country’s “evolving standards of decency”—i.e., social norms—was hotly contested. 173 
171 A recent case assessing the scope of maritime jurisdiction, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 125 S. Ct. 385 
(2004), illustrates this point in a different context.  At issue was whether maritime jurisdiction would 
encompass the “‘new era’” of technological change in cargo container transportation.  Id. at 394 (internal 
citation omitted).   
While it may once have seemed natural to think that only contracts embodying 
commercial obligations between the “tackles” (i.e., from port to port) have maritime 
objectives, the shore is now an artificial place to draw a line.  Maritime commerce has 
evolved along with the nature of transportation and is often inseparable from some land-
based obligations.   
Id. at 394.  We might guess at the nature of the norms that enabled the Court to move from one vision of 
maritime jurisdiction to another—perhaps it was a commitment to realism over formalism or a Swift v. 
Tyson-like judgment that the nation would benefit from broadening the reach of federal law in this area.  
For our purposes here, though, the specific norm or norms that guided understandings of the fact of the 
changed technology is unimportant; what matters is that, to the Court, the norms did not require mention as 
part of its decision to abandon one set of facts for another.   
172 This observation may have only limited value outside the context of facts related to social groups.  For 
example, many of the facts on which evidence law is based have been shown to be incorrect, yet the law’s 
dissonance with reality continues to be tolerated relatively easily.  See, e.g., Bryan A. Lang, Shortcuts to 
“Truth”: The Legal Mythology of Dying Declarations, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 259 (1998) (observing 
that “none of the considerations” that support the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule “rest on 
any relevant empirical evidence or study of the matter”).  However, factually inaccurate assumptions of 
evidence law are far less likely to be known by the general public, and, therefore, less likely to raise doubts 
about judicial capacity than similarly incorrect characterizations of social groups.    
In addition, if a community remained invested deeply in a traditional normative fact, a court would 
not necessarily be compelled to embrace the “new” knowledge even if it persuasively destabilized the old 
“fact.”  In this respect, courts have discretion either to embrace change, which they can do credibly by 
highlighting empirical evidence that discredits the old fact, or ignore “new” evidence and embrace the fact 
that is popular in the surrounding community.  Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), might be said to 
reflect the latter option.  In sustaining Virginia’s antimiscegenation law, the Virginia Supreme Court 
acknowledged the California Supreme Court’s observation in Perez that interracial marriage “could not be 
considered vitally detrimental to public health and morals.”  Id. at 753 (citing Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 
17, 31 (Cal. 1948)).  It rejected that view, however, and embraced instead the fact that interracial marriage 
would produce a “mongrel breed of citizens,” linking its validation of Virginia’s antimiscegenation law to 
historical fact:  “[H]istory teach[es] that nations and races have better advanced in human progress when 
they cultivated their own distinctive characteristics and culture and developed their own peculiar genius.”  
Id. at 756. 
173 Eighth Amendment doctrine commands the Court to identify the social norms, in the form of decency 
standards, against which particular applications of the death penalty must be weighed.  See Roper, 125 S. 
Ct. at 1190 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)); see also id. at 1191 (discussing “[t]he 
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As these cases show, while agreement could be reached relatively easily regarding the 
content of “thin” facts—i.e., the “objective indicia of consensus” such as “the enactments 
of legislatures,”174 determination of those fact’s social meaning was anything but 
uncomplicated.175 
In Roper v. Simmons, most recently, the majority found that “objective indicia” 
demonstrated “national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles”176 based on, 
inter alia, state legislatures’ abolition of the juvenile death penalty, “the infrequency of 
[the penalty’s] use even where it remain[ed] on the books; and the consistency in the 
trend toward abolition of the practice.”177 The Court found, too, that social science 
evidence of juveniles’ “diminished culpability” relative to adults reinforced this 
position.178 
According to Justice O’Connor’s dissent, however, the same facts “fail[ed] to 
demonstrate conclusively that any [genuine national] consensus has emerged” in the 
“brief period” since the Court sustained the juvenile death penalty in 1989.179 She 
characterized the pace of change as “halting,”180 and found the majority’s analysis 
 
inquiry into our society’s evolving standards of decency”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) 
(quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101) (same). 
174 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.  The Court has described this statutory source as “[t]he clearest and most 
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.”  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).  
Disagreement, unrelated to the point here, exists as to whether and to what extent judges should consider 
their own judgment as well.  See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s view 
that “[t]he Constitution . . . contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the 
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eight Amendment.”) (internal punctuation 
omitted) (emphasis in original). 
175 For example, norms, not facts, would dictate whether evidence of differences in decision-making 
capacity of people with mental retardation and juveniles should be accorded legal salience.  Further, norms 
would determine whether and how information about international norms should be factored into the 
analysis.    
176 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194, 1192. These indicia, the Court found, “provide sufficient evidence that today 
our society views juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’”  Id. at 1194 
(quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316). 
177 Id. at 1194. 
178 Id. at 1196. 
179 Id. at 1206 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)). 
180 Id. at 1211. 
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regarding the culpability of juvenile offenders to “def[y] common sense.”181 Justice 
Scalia, also dissenting, declared the majority’s identification of norm change based on 
changed empirical facts to be “implausible,”182 especially given “the fact that a number of 
legislatures and voters have expressly affirmed their support for capital punishment of 
16- and 17-year old offenders” since the Court’s earlier ruling on the issue.183 He, like 
Justice O’Connor, accused the Court of giving meaning to empirical facts based on 
personal preferences:  “[A]ll the court has done today . . . is to look over the heads of the 
crowd and pick out its friends.”184 
A similar split erupted in Atkins v. Virginia.185 For the Atkins majority, the 
“consensus reflected in [the] deliberations” of “the American public, legislators, scholars, 
and judges” was against imposition of the death penalty on people with mental 
retardation.186 Justice Scalia, in dissent, declared the majority’s identification of a norm 
based on those sources to be “empty talk,”187 and charged that the majority had relied on 
its “feelings and intuition” to give meaning to these facts.188 
The sharp dispute over how to glean norms from facts highlights the amorphous, 
contestable nature of norms relative to facts.  This difference means not only that courts 
are particularly vulnerable in declaring norms but also that, conceptually, facts are easier 
to discredit than norms.  Norms, as judgments, are simply not subject to the same kinds 
 
181 Id. at 1214. 
182 Id. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
183 Id. at 1220. 
184 Id. at 1223. See also Jeffrey Rosen, Juvenile Logic, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 2005, at 11 
(criticizing the majority’s conclusion that international norms almost universally oppose application of the 
death penalty to juveniles).  
185 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
186 Id. at 316, 307.  The Court also pointed to social science evidence to conclude that people with mental 
retardation have diminished culpability.  Id. at 318-19 & nn. 23 & 24. (“Their deficiencies . . . diminish 
their personal culpability.”). 
187 Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
188 Id. (emphasis in original).  Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, focused criticism on the majority’s 
reliance on “international opinion, the views of professional and religious organizations, and opinion polls 
not demonstrated to be reliable.”  Id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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of testing and verification as facts, whether those facts are “thick” or “thin.”  As a result, 
demonstrating a court’s flawed reliance on an outdated norm is difficult, at best.  Not 
surprisingly, then, courts experience more pressure to reject discredited facts (which will 
typically be “thick” facts, as “thin” facts are less likely to undergo change) and to steer 
clear of overtly selecting among contested norms wherever possible.   
In addition to the relatively high exposure of facts and the relative difficulty of 
discerning norms, risks related to judicial legitimacy incentivize courts to focus on facts 
and avoid evaluating norms.  Should a court affirm a norm as a justification for 
government’s limiting a social group’s rights, it could appear to be inappropriately 
substituting categorical acceptance of majoritarian preferences for its own judicial 
review.  If, on the other hand, a court rejects the dominant norm, it might appear to be 
substituting its own normative views for those of the people, a disfavored 
countermajoritarian move.  In this light, fact-based decision-making appears to offer a 
convenient escape from these two undesirable options. 
This institutional constraint-based theory seems, on its face, to provide a neat 
explanation for fact-based decision-making—courts are likely to be less vulnerable to 
criticism of overstepping if they make decisions based on relatively uncontested facts and 
avoid staking out positions among competing norms.  On the other hand, however, fact-
based adjudication has not protected courts from controversy regarding the limits of 
judicial power.  It is hard to imagine that the criticism of the Supreme Court’s 
interventions in contested social arenas as in Brown, Romer, and Grutter would have 
been significantly different had the Court been more open about the normative 
underpinnings of its decisions.  To the extent the public pays attention to the Supreme 
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Court’s actions, it reacts to holdings, not reasoning.189 Likewise, the focus on facts has 
not prevented academics and lawyers, as well as peers in the judiciary, from identifying 
and criticizing decisions’ normative underpinnings and implications either in scholarly 
publications, trade publications or dissenting opinions.   
Even if fact-based decision-making is dubious as a strategy for preserving judicial 
legitimacy, the difficulties associated with norm identification arguably trigger real 
concerns regarding institutional capacity that could explain courts’ orientation toward 
fact-based decision making.  Yet this argument is also less than fully convincing—there 
is no admission in the Eighth Amendment cases, for example, that norms of decency are 
difficult to identify.  Even the dissents in Roper and Atkins, which excoriate the 
majority’s norm identification, do not suggest that discerning norms from facts is difficult 
but only that the majority erred in doing so.  Further, there is no shortage of cases in 
which courts declare norms and treat them as decisive, as shown above.190 The judicial 
dynamic by which fact-based decisions precede norm declarations illustrates a preference 
for delaying the normative analysis but not for avoiding it altogether.  There is nothing in 
the cases, in other words, suggesting that courts sense themselves to be fundamentally 
constrained from identifying norms because of capacity limitations.  
Perhaps fact-based decision-making should be seen as without significance, then, 
beyond its function to mask judges’ penchant for manipulating the adjudication process 
to reach preferred results.  After all, to the extent that fact-based decisions are more 
defensible than norm declarations for the reasons discussed above, they provide better 
cover for judges’ underlying interests in outcome.  On the other hand, though, the cover-
 
189 John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Public Holds U.S. Supreme Court in High Regard, 77 JUDICATURE 
273 (1994), cited in Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008, 
2028-30 (2002).   
190 See supra Part I.  
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up theory is inadequate for the same reasons the legitimacy and capacity arguments are 
not fully satisfactory.  To the extent the public pays attention to judicial action, it is 
looking to outcomes, not opinions.  The legal elite likewise suspects ideological 
motivation on the part of many judges.191 Deployment of careful rhetoric does not 
alleviate that concern and, in fact, may heighten criticism of judicial dishonesty.   
This is not to suggest that either institutional constraints or results-orientation 
have no effect on adjudicators.  Surely it is true that, at times, fact-based decisions will be 
less likely to trigger criticism, or at least less likely to trigger as much criticism—either 
from the public or the bar—than overtly normative decisions.  But given that neither 
theory fully resolves our inquiry, several others warrant consideration. 
Quite possibly, the judicial reaction to changing views of social groups simply 
mirrors the way in which the broader public experiences those changes.  That is, while 
norms inevitably inform attitudes about the status and capacity of group members, they 
are often not consciously experienced, particularly as those attitudes begin to change.  
Instead, a previously disdained group comes to be seen as more capable than previously 
thought based on group members’ workforce participation, artistic accomplishments, or 
other activities.  Only later does the normative overlay of the earlier-held views regarding 
group members become apparent.  In this light, fact-based intervention neither reflects 
institutional constraints nor masks result-orientation but instead reflects the way in which 
human beings change their views about social groups.   
This theory, which can also be taken as a description of how norms move from a 
 
191 See, e.g., BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002); A BADLY 
FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002).  
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naturalized to a destabilized state,192 goes some way toward explaining how courts can 
rely on facts to reject previously accepted norms regarding social group members’ rights 
and leave unacknowledged the normative shift implicated by their changed position.  
This helps explain, too, some of the ways in which courts seem genuinely unaware of the 
normative underpinnings of their decisions, as in the seemingly authentic disbelief of the 
majority in Nguyen at being called sexist by the dissent.193 
But the “nature of social change” theory, by itself, is also insufficient.  Even if the 
Nguyen majority could not see that women’s role in childbirth could not automatically 
explain the sex-based immigration rule, surely the Court in Brown and Romer, among 
other cases, was well aware of those decisions’ normative dimensions and was quite 
deliberate in not acknowledging them.  What else then, beyond institutional constraints 
and the desire for rhetorical cover, might explain the strategic use of facts to intervene in 
norm contests regarding social groups? 
A further reason that courts may avoid declaring changes in social norms relates 
more to institutional interests in aggrandizing power than to institutional constraints on 
the way judicial power is exercised.  Courts that frame a decision as rejecting a norm 
rather than as responding to a fact (or a fact change) risk committing themselves to a 
broad doctrinal position that limits room to maneuver in later cases.  A court might want 
to reject a norm in one context, for example, but might not want to risk embracing 
rejection of that norm in similar settings.  By avoiding all discussion of the norm, the risk 
 
192 See supra notes 137-144 and accompanying text. 
193 Although one could argue that the majority was willfully ignoring the dissent’s point, I read the 
majority’s response as failing to join issue with the dissent’s claim of sex-based bias because it simply does 
not grasp or find credible the dissent’s point. 
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of a stare decisis roadblock is averted or at least minimized.194 
A counterfactual may help test this.  In Reed v. Reed,195 as discussed above, the 
Court never addressed the normative fact of “natural differences” between men and 
women that the Idaho Supreme Court held justified the subordination of wives to 
husbands in estate administration.  What if, instead of ignoring the Idaho court’s 
rationale, the U.S. Supreme Court had unraveled norm from fact and rejected the natural 
domesticity norm as impermissible?  In addition to the risk of being charged with 
inappropriately and ineptly intervening in a cultural debate, the Court potentially would 
have disabled use of “natural” sex differences to justify government action in other cases.  
This is a position the Court was, and remains, unwilling to take.196 Rejecting the general 
norm, in other words, would have gone too far doctrinally, in addition to the myriad legal 
process-type problems it might have generated.   
Perhaps, then, the court could have limited its rejection of the general norm’s 
application to the context at issue.  Instead of focusing on the empirical justification’s 
inadequacy, the court might have held that judgments about “natural sex differences” did 
not support differential sex-based estate administration rules.  But recognizing the norm 
shift even in this narrow way would have been riskier than the Court’s empirically-
focused analysis because the concession of normative change begs the questions whether 
any sex-based distinction in treatment could be justified by “natural” differences and, if 
so, how?  By not acknowledging its rejection of the norm, the court enabled itself and 
lower courts to sidestep more easily the resurfacing of “natural” differences in other 
 
194 The literature on judicial minimalism illustrates the existence of this approach, see, e.g., Sunstein, supra 
note 25, but does not explore the particular incentives courts have to make minimalist decisions in the 
context considered here.     
195 404 U.S. 71 (1971).   
196 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 
U.S. 464 (1981). 
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cases.  
Justice Scalia highlighted the power of explicit norm rejection to constrain future 
decision-making in Lawrence v. Texas. There, he castigated the majority and the 
concurrence for assuming they could reject the norm of gay people’s immorality as a 
rationale for Texas’ Homosexual Conduct Law but then accept the same norm to justify 
sexual orientation-based distinctions in the military or marriage.197 “This case ‘does not 
involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle 
and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court,” he wrote.198 
One of the benefits of leaving regulation of this matter to the people rather 
than to the courts is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to 
their logical conclusion.  The people may feel that their disapprobation of 
homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow homosexual marriage, 
but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual acts—and may 
legislate accordingly.  The Court today pretends that it possesses a similar 
freedom of action[.]199 
In contrast to majoritarian bodies, which can pick and choose among norms, courts, as 
Justice Scalia suggested, have significantly less flexibility.  Once a general norm has 
been rejected in one context, it is difficult, at best, to resuscitate that norm in a related 
case.   
In some respects, this last theory is the strongest candidate to account for the fact-
oriented approach courts bring to social change claims.  Its explanatory value does not 
depend on courts being conscious of the normative positions implicated by their opinions; 
courts making fact-based decisions might either be unsure of how to articulate the 
normative shift or, conceivably, unaware of the normative position their opinion reflects, 
 
197 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589-90 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The mediating norm here was 
unable to remain unacknowledged in Lawrence because it was held out, by the state, as the justification for 
continued differential treatment of gay people.  Had some other, more empirical justification been 
advanced, the Court conceivably could have rejected that, as it did in Romer, without engaging explicitly 
with the underlying norm. 
198 Id. at 605. 
199 Id. at 604. 
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as in cases where norms remain deeply naturalized.  Whatever the motivation for its use, 
whether to achieve instrumental goals or respect institutional constraints, fact-based 
intervention in contested normative arenas is only minimally restrictive of future 
exercises of judicial power.  In other words, this power-conservation theory recognizes 
that a variety of concerns may motivate courts to prefer facts to norms but that underlying 
all of these potential motivations is an instinct to preserve as much decision-making 
power as possible for future cases.   
This theory’s weakness, however, is that it fails to explain why courts would ever 
declare norms if to do so is power-restricting.  One also could argue, in a different vein, 
that norm declarations are not as restrictive of future exercises of judicial power as the 
theory suggests.  The Supreme Court has regularly rejected a normative preference for 
equality, for example, on the grounds that the facts require a different analysis.200 
Still, we might resuscitate the theory by distilling its essence—that although 
courts may reach a point of comfort with norm declarations, the judicial instinct upon 
entering new normative terrain is to drop a relatively light anchor that allows for ease of 
movement in the future.  Only later, once the terrain is better know, is greater security 
regarding the selected position likely to arise.  At that point, but not before, courts may 
find sufficient comfort to drop the heavier anchor in the form of stating the underlying 
norm, though still with the knowledge that some limited future drifting is possible.   
 
V.  The Legitimacy of Fact-Based Adjudication:  Would Candor Be Better? 
Up to this point, this article has focused mainly on the positive task of describing 
and theorizing the way in which courts respond to changing societal views regarding 
 
200 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (distinguishing restrictions 
on gay people in marriage and the military from restrictions related to sexual intimacy).   
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social groups.  This final section will take a more evaluative approach to assess whether, 
even in light of the reasons supporting the emergence of fact-based reasoning as an 
adjudication strategy, candor about the normative grounding of judicial decision-making 
would be preferable.  Put another way, since we know that every decision regarding 
limitations on the rights of a social group takes a normative position regarding that 
group’s status or capacity, whether acknowledged or not, the discussion here considers 
what would be gained—and lost—by consistent exposure of those normative positions.   
In the literature on judicial candor, several general positions have been staked out.  
At one end is the argument that candor is always, or almost always, preferable.  From this 
perspective, obscuring the “real” reason for decisions is disagreeable as a matter of 
general principle and potentially dangerous to the stability and credibility of courts if 
accepted as a matter of institutional design.201 On the other end is the argument that 
candor, in the sense of introspection by judges regarding the genuine reasons for their 
decisions, actually might harm the judicial process by weakening judges’ internalized 
sense of obligation to follow rules rather than exercise unconstrained discretion.202 In 
between are pragmatic, instrumental arguments suggesting that political and other 
constraints render candor, even if desirable, an unrealistic aim.203 
Before assessing the potential value of increased candor in connection with social 
group litigation, two preliminary points require attention. First, I assume that even if 
 
201 See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 251-52 (1964) (describing 
“a reputation for candor” as the Supreme Court’s “precious political asset”); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND (1930); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988); 
David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987) [hereinafter Shapiro, 
Judicial Candor]; Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 721 (1979). Cf. 
CALABRESI, supra note 8 (advocating candor but acknowledging that judges experience different 
constraints than scholars). 
202 See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Candor of 
Justice Marshall, 6 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 83 (1989); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist:  
Statues and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 249-57 (1983).  But see Gail Heriot, Way 
Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1945 (1991) (critiquing Altman’s arguments).   
203 See Shapiro, Judicial Candor, supra note 201, at 742. 
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norms cannot be described as precisely as facts, it is possible, in virtually all cases, to 
articulate some aspect of the governing norm.  Indeed, given the frequent efforts in 
dissenting opinions to expose and criticize the norms allegedly ignored by the majority, 
the hurdle of norm identification does not seem insuperable as a practical matter. 
The second concerns the meaning of candor.  Although the literature defines 
candor in multiple ways, a consistent thread is a focus on “the declarant’s state of 
mind.”204 Much of the literature deems a candor requirement to be satisfied if a judge 
does not intend to deceive others; self-deception is treated as a separate issue.205 For 
purposes here, I take a view of candor that extends beyond avoidance of deliberate 
deception and includes an expectation that courts identify and articulate the normative 
underpinnings of their decisions.  Through this approach, I mean to reach cases in which 
norms are deeply naturalized and seen as inseparable from fact, as in decisions based on 
the “natural” ordering of race or sex, as well as decisions in which courts deliberately 
avoid addressing norms.  In this way, I can test more fully the consequences of displacing 
the fact-based adjudication fiction with a more transparent approach to decision-making 
in social group cases. 
What might be gained, then, from increased pressure on courts to acknowledge 
expressly the normative grounds for their opinions in social change cases?  Leaving aside 
general moral preferences for honesty,206 several possible benefits come to mind.  First, 
returning to the theories offered earlier as to why courts prefer to avoid norms, we might 
 
204 Id. at 732. 
205 See Altman, supra note 202, at 297 (suggesting a distinction between candid, meaning “never being 
consciously duplicitous” and introspective, meaning “critically examining one’s mental states to avoid any 
self-deception or error”); Shapiro, Judicial Candor, supra note 201, at 732 (excluding self-deception from 
an analysis of the value of judicial candor).  Earlier literature, such as that of the legal realists, treated the 
two as more closely aligned.  See Altman, supra note 202, at 297-98 (“The realists urged judges to 
recognize and to disclose the motivations that the judges deny . . . .”). 
206 Cf. Sissela Bok, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LIFE (1978).  
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conclude that greater transparency regarding decisions’ normative underpinnings would 
constrain courts to take consistent normative positions regarding a social group, or at 
least to make efforts to reconcile dissonant positions.  As is, courts can largely blink stare 
decisis constraints and step around earlier decisions by reference to facts without 
explaining conflicting normative positions in their jurisprudence.       
Second, it might be that, if forced to expose their normative positions, some 
courts would decide cases differently, suggesting that transparency could impose at least 
partial restraint on judges’ otherwise relatively unconstrained exercise of their result-
oriented preferences.  Of course, one can always argue that courts will offer what they 
perceive to be “acceptable” norms to justify decisions that are actually driven by 
“unacceptable” motives.  But the demand of exposure both adds pressure to do the 
additional work of identifying a non-controversial norm and may, in some cases, impose 
a meaningful limit on result-oriented decision-making.  Perhaps the scope is limited, but 
for certain types of distinctions between social groups, the task of drumming up a 
passable norm may be either too difficult or not worth the risk to judicial credibility.  For 
example, as suggested earlier, had the Court in Nguyen been pressured to identify the 
norm that linked the empirical fact of childbirth to a rule that presumed women were 
more likely to nurture their children than men, it might have hesitated to take that 
strongly contested position.  
Third, we might conclude that greater openness regarding normative motivation 
would be desirable from the vantage point of social change advocates.  Even if litigation 
resulted in losses for a social group, the justificatory rationales would have to be stated 
clearly.  In contrast to the current practice, which permits empirical facts to stand in for 
negative norms, even after these norms have been discredited as factual descriptions of 
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group members, the clarity that would flow from a candor requirement might enable 
future challenges to be more focused and, potentially, more successful.     
On the other hand, this last point also calls attention to the double-edged nature of 
transparency from the point of view of social group advocates.  Social movements are in 
a relatively stronger position to debunk erroneous traditional facts about group members 
than to disprove norms, as discussed earlier, since norms are not falsifiable in the way 
that facts typically are.207 Social science analysis likewise can be deployed against 
factual mischaracterizations of groups but is far less effective in challenging norms.  
Thus, if decisions turn on facts rather than norms, advocates for social change have 
greater opportunity to offer definitive, or at least more powerful, critiques than if 
decisions turn overtly on norms.208 
Further, and perhaps more importantly from a legal process and institutional 
design standpoint, fact-based decisions may, through their lack of overt norm declaration, 
encourage extrajudicial conversation regarding appropriate norms by other governmental 
institutions and the general public.  Judicial declarations, in contrast, are likely to limit 
the scope of future legislative activity209 and the effectiveness of social science and social 
movements on views of social groups.  Simply put, norm declaration closes doors more 
definitively than norm avoidance.  Much like common law decisions are more easily 
adjustable than constitutional decisions, even though those also are not fixed absolutely, 
fact-based decisions leave room for greater movement than norm-based decisions.  In this 
 
207 See supra text accompanying note 172. 
208 An additional risk for advocates of social change is that a court’s explicit identification and approval of 
a negative norm about group members will reify and strengthen the norm to a greater extent than a decision 
that affirms the norm implicitly.    
209 Judicial affirmation of a traditional norm raises political risks for a majoritarian legislature that is 
inclined to reject that norm.  Advocates for the traditional norm will be strengthened in their claim that the 
legislature has acted based on personal preferences rather than to reflect the majority’s will.  Likewise, 
legislative rejection of a traditional norm may spark legal challenges and sharpen public criticism by 
adherents of the traditional norm.   
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way, when making fact-based decisions, particularly in contested normative arenas, 
courts are leaving open the possibility that norms will emerge with greater clarity from 
other, more representative bodies.  One could conclude, then, that while it is not fully 
transparent, a fact-based approach has the significant benefit of minimizing the concerns 
that typically plague courts as nonmajoritarian bodies.  With this point in the balance, the 
conclusion seems reasonable that complete candor, including regular norm identification, 
is not fully desirable even if it were possible in adjudication of social group claims. 
These latter arguments, including the preservation of freedom to maneuver in 
future cases and the encouragement of extrajudicial participation in norm determination, 
strike me as generally desirable.210 There is a serious problem, however, in that the fact-
based decision-making fiction is exploited to excess—courts not only avoid mentioning 
the normative grounds for their decisions but also allow the fiction to override the need 
for recognizing connections among cases involving related norms.  This is not to say that 
the norm shift in case 1 must also occur in case 2 involving the same social group but 
rather that, if the norm shift is refused in case 2, that determination should be reconciled 
overtly with the decision in case 1.    
This dynamic, by which related cases are not treated as such, appears strikingly in 
the marriage cases with which this article began.  In the majority of these cases, courts 
have rejected the claims of lesbians and gay men seeking to marry.  Most often, as 
discussed earlier, marriage is found to be reserved justifiably for different-sex couples 
because those couples can, in theory if not reality, procreate without third party 
 
210 The position impels important questions about whether adjudication that avoids full disclosure and 
defense of underlying normative choices should ever be tolerated and, further, about the scope and extent 
of candor that should be expected of judges that are sensitive to the role of norms in their decision-making.  
In the interests of focusing on the problem at hand, I will set aside the broadest iterations of these questions 
and concentrate here on their application in the context of claims that courts should integrate societal 
change. 
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assistance.  One might argue that these rationales concern the essence of marriage rather 
than anything particular to the social group of gay people.  When this reasoning is set 
against the background of marriage case law, however, it becomes clear that the law of 
marriage does not now, and has never, treated procreation as essential.211 Why, then, has 
procreative capacity emerged as the definitive factual justification for excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage?  Most of the cases do not seek to explain this reasoning by 
anything other than a glib reference to history and/or to traditional views of marriage.212 
One court has gone further to suggest that marriage is necessary to impose order on 
heterosexual procreation, something not needed for same-sex couples whose procreation 
is necessarily more deliberate.213 
Yet it is somewhat difficult to take seriously, in light of common sense as well as 
the legislative framework and case law concerning marriage, the suggestion that egg, 
sperm, and gestation are more fundamental to marriage than the lifetime of parenting 
responsibilities of the adult partners after childbirth.  Indeed, as the fact/norm framework 
 
211 Laurence Drew Borten, Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1089 (2002).  Certainly today, economic interdependence is widely acknowledged as the primary function 
of civil marriage.  Civil marriage has always been an economic relationship between the spouses, although 
during coverture, the relationship was less about interdependence than about wives’ legal status merging 
into that of their husbands.  Emotional interdependence and childrearing are occasionally recognized as 
important as well, though far more in the public discourse than in domestic relations jurisprudence.  
Procreation, on the other hand, has been specifically disavowed as a marital requirement, as indicated by 
the law delineating eligibility for marriage, annulment law, and the constitutional protection for a woman’s 
right, even absent her husband’s consent, to terminate a pregnancy.   Neither is procreation limited by law 
to marriage.  Id.   
212 On history and tradition as justifications for government action, see, e.g., Rebecca Brown, Tradition 
and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177 (1993); Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of 
Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665 (1997); Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995). 
213 Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“What does the difference between 
‘natural’ reproduction on the one hand and assisted reproduction and adoption on the other mean for 
constitutional purposes?  It means that it impacts the State of Indiana’s clear interest in seeing that children 
are raised in stable environments.  Those persons who have invested the significant time, effort, and 
expense associated with assisted reproduction or adoption may be seen as very likely to be able to provide 
such an environment, with or without the ‘protections’ of marriage, because of the high level of financial 
and emotional commitment exerted in conceiving or adopting a child or children in the first place. 
By contrast, procreation by ‘natural’ reproduction may occur without any thought for the future.”) 
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illustrates, the facts of procreation alone are simply insufficient as explanations for the 
sex-based restriction in marriage law.  They are not evaluative or explanatory; a norm 
must give meaning to those facts to justify their use to exclude same-sex couples from 
marriage.  This explanatory deficit is particularly striking since many same-sex couples 
do procreate—albeit with third party assistance.214 
The challenge, then, is to identify the norms for which the biological facts of 
procreation stand in.  Put another way, we must ask what normative position a court is 
taking regarding parenting by lesbians and gay men if it sustains a marriage law that 
excludes gay couples on the grounds of procreative capacity.  Most courts have yet to 
pose these questions, let alone answer them.215 Instead, they treat procreation as 
sufficient, without explanation, to sustain different marriage rules for gay and non-gay 
people.   
Even if we accept the lack of candor regarding the norms underlying procreation, 
however, a separate question exists as to whether it is also legitimate for the same courts 
to disregard other cases in which the procreative capacity of gay adults, and gay parents 
in particular, has not been given a negative normative value.  In most of the states in 
which marriage challenges have been adjudicated, there is ample case law holding that 
sexual orientation should not be taken into account in making custody and visitation 
decisions absent some showing of harm to the child.216 These cases embody and often 
express directly a normative judgment about the relative equality of gay and non-gay 
 
214 Of course, many different-sex couples procreate with third-party assistance as well.   
215 But see Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
216 See Patricia M. Logue, The Facts of Life for Gay and Lesbian Parents, 25 FAM. ADVOC. 43, 44 (2002) 
(“The overwhelming trend in custody and visitation cases is not to attach negative presumptions about 
parenting or conduct to a parent’s sexual orientation, but to look at whether there is any evidence of harm 
to children. . . .  A clear majority of states takes this approach.  In recent years, even states generally 
considered socially conservative on issues of homosexuality and parenting have disclaimed any per-se rule 
restricting custody for lesbian or gay parents on the basis of sexual orientation alone.”). 
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parents.  A court wishing to treat gay and non-gay parents as normatively unequal in the 
marriage context potentially could still do so, perhaps on the ground that the cases 
embracing contrary norms reflect individualized determinations about parenting rather 
than broad policy judgments.217 Complete failure to wrestle with the dissonant normative 
position in these cases, however, amounts not only to a lack of candor but also to a kind 
of duplicity through the deliberate disregard of related precedent.218 
Conceivably, even with strong precedent rejecting legal distinctions between gay 
and non-gay parents, courts still might hesitate to strike down a marriage law for fear of 
exerting judicial fiat in the public domain.  But this hesitation is either naïve or 
disingenuous and rests on the same misconceptions that empowers fact-based 
adjudication.  For one, any decision—including a decision to sustain the status quo—
reflects a selection among competing norms regarding the social group of gay people, as 
shown earlier.   
Second, the profession that the plaintiffs’ challenge must be rejected out of 
deference to the legislature disregards that the legislature typically has spoken to the 
issue before the court.  Domestic relations law in states across the country makes clear, as 
noted earlier, that a couple’s capacity to procreate without assistance is neither necessary 
nor sufficient as a marriage qualification.  But there is more than that.  The legislatures in 
most states where marriage litigation is taking place also have expressed normative 
judgments about the difference (or lack thereof) between gay and non-gay parents 
through legislative frameworks regarding adoption, foster care, guardianship and other 
 
217 I would disagree with this distinction in that decisions on these issues announce principles to be applied 
beyond the case at bar, but will leave my disagreement at that, for now.     
218 I take this position cognizant of Karl Llewellyn’s point that a determined court can distinguish 
precedent in a variety of ways.  KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
(1960).  Llewellyn assumes, for the most part, that precedent will be distinguished, not ignored.  Forcing 
that exposure on a consistent basis is a check, even if an imperfect one, against judicial duplicity. 
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mechanisms related to parenting and adult care for children.  If the state’s view is that 
gay people do not make as good parents as non-gay people, surely that would be reflected 
in the law concerning children who are wards of the state.219 If the state’s view is that 
couples capable of procreating without assistance make better parents than other couples, 
we would expect that, too, to be reflected in these laws.  But such prohibitions exist as 
outliers, if at all.220 Even further, courts in many of these states have authorized second-
parent adoptions so that both parents in a same-sex couple can establish a legal 
relationship with the child(ren) they are raising.  Yet in none of these states has the 
legislature acted to overturn a second-parent adoption ruling on the ground that same-sex 
couples should not be encouraged to parent.   
One might object immediately that the federalist system does and should allow 
precisely this sort of state-by-state experimentation, so that federal equal protection law 
should not prohibit states from holding differing public policy visions.  The question 
here, however, is not whether experimentation in the abstract remains desirable.  Instead, 
it is whether the justification on which the state relies for its experimentation remains 
permissible in light of the burden imposed.  In addressing this question, judicial review 
that takes account of societal changes to normative views of social groups even could be 
characterized as state-respecting, in that its cues regarding the continued legitimacy of 
these views come from the activities of the states themselves.   
The approach proposed here should be even less controversial with respect to 
state constitutional analysis, given that the restriction on a social group could be 
 
219 See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Svcs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(sustaining Florida’s ban on adoption by lesbian and gay adults), reh’g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). For a critique of the 11th Circuit’s decision in Lofton,
see, e.g., Mark Strasser, Rebellion in the Eleventh Circuit:  On Lawrence, Lofton, and the Best Interests of 
Children, 40 TULSA L. REV. 421 (2005). 
220 See Strasser, supra note 219. 
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measured against other treatments of that group intrastate.221 Again, the candor 
requirement would not mandate a coherent set of norms regarding a group but rather a 
legitimate explanation for the continued use of the rights-restricting norm when norms 
are in conflict. 
Justice Scalia would object, as he did in his Lawrence dissent, that by looking to 
norms reflected in legislation as well as in judicial precedent, courts would impose an 
unduly burdensome requirement that legislatures act on consistent principles rather than 
moving incrementally.222 But this concern is not as grave as it might appear.  The 
proposal here is not that courts invalidate legislation unless it is in lockstep with 
principles reflected in similar laws.223 Indeed, such a proposal would be futile given that 
legislatures typically do not work so coherently, and that laws often reflect a diversity of 
norms regarding social groups.224 Also, courts retain the authority to decide whether and 
how far to carry a norm from one context to another.  The additional argument that this 
flexibility allows courts too much discretion merely restates the discretion that is 
characteristic of judicial decision making.  Relating one context to another has long been 
the essence of judicial practice.   
The objection that courts ought to affirm the traditional view of a social group and 
“leave change to the legislature” in the interest of minimizing their invasiveness in public 
 
221 See Kaye, supra note 9, at 16 (recognizing that state courts’ “use of the common law to define rights at 
times has been preferable in that it has allowed both courts and legislatures room to adapt principles to 
changed circumstances” and observing that federal courts lack “that same flexibility” because of their 
limited powers to create common law). 
222 See supra text accompanying notes 197-199.  
223 Indeed, courts need not look to legislation at all.  While legislation, like case law, may provide useful 
insight into the settling of norms that are related directly to the rationale being considered by a court, the 
candor requirement conceivably could be limited to case law.   
224 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 129 (1971) (“I’m 
skeptical that a method of forcing articulation of purposes [by legislatures] can be developed that will be 
both workable and helpful.”); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 222, 233-
35 (1976) (arguing that the natural of the lawmaking process renders legislative intent difficult to discern).   
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debates similarly is misconceived.  Because legislation tends to respond more quickly to 
societal change than common law or constitutional law, “new” views regarding social 
groups ordinarily will be reflected in statutes well before courts begin adjudicating 
constitutional claims.  Indeed, in the area of gay rights, one might see the marriage 
exclusion as the outlier case that requires judicial correction because the political process 
has failed to eradicate a norm disapproving gay parents that has been rejected in many 
other contexts.  Affirming traditional disapproval for gay parents, therefore, is not a 
neutral move but instead runs counter to other legislative expression on the same issue.  
Judicial support for the status quo gives renewed legal force to a norm that has been 
either affirmatively disavowed or left unembraced by the majoritarian legislature.   
Further, if all other sexual orientation-based distinctions have been removed from 
statutes and case law, their retention in marriage law arguably has occurred because it is 
not politically tenable for the legislature to clean up the last vestiges of longstanding 
hostility toward the social group at issue.225 From this perspective, courts seem 
particularly well-suited, as enforcers of equal protection and other constitutional 
guarantees, to identify the occurrence of process failure.  Of course, it is also possible that 
the exclusionary law’s survival in the face of other changes demonstrates not that process 
failure has occurred but rather than the interaction of marriage and same-sex couples is 
somehow different from all other law related to sexual orientation.  But if that is the 
claim, it ought to be defended.  To the extent the contemporary approach of fact-based 
adjudication safeguards courts from that pressure to defend, it presents not merely a 
 
225 See ELY, supra note 224.  Consider, for example, the refusal of some legislatures to repeal sodomy 
prohibitions even after judicial invalidation.  See, e.g., Cassandra M. DeLaMothe, Note, Liberta Revisited: 
A Call to Repeal the Marital Exemption for All Sex Offenses in New York’s Penal Law, 23 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 857, 894 (1996) (noting that “in 1980, the New York Court of Appeals declared [New York’s law 
criminalizing non-commercial sexual conduct between consenting adults] unconstitutional as a violation of 
the right to privacy in People v. Onofre. To date, the statute remains on the books.”) (citation omitted). 
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pragmatic mode of analysis but a cover for result-oriented decision-making that should be 
removed.  
 
Conclusion 
Wherever one comes out on the ultimate question of how much account courts 
should take of societal change, the constant involvement of courts in assessing social 
norms cannot reasonably be ignored.  Courts evaluate and select among competing norms 
related to the status and capacity of social groups on a regular basis, even when those 
norms are contested and even when their normative choices go unacknowledged.  
Consequently, the presumption made by many courts, elected officials and commentators 
that courts avoid influencing norm contests when they reject social change-based claims 
is misconceived.  It is the fiction of fact-based adjudication, not a unique aptitude of 
courts to make decisions without normative choices, that enables judgments to be made 
without mention of norms.  Our theories of judicial review will be better off, both with 
respect to descriptive accuracy and normative bite, to the extent they embrace, rather than 
overlook, this reality. 
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